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Of Bakke's Balance, Gratz and Grutter. 
The Voice of Justice Powell 
Paul R. Baier· 
Justice Powells Bakke balance, announced all alone twenty-five years ago, is now the 
Jaw of the land Hopwood is dead This Essay of judicial personality and process traces the 
influence of Justice Powells so.fl voice, his mediating ooy, through the competing judicial 
opinions in Gratz and Grutter. Bakke s balance is the formula by which the Court purports to 
decide both the University and the Law Schools case. Gratz is no problem. It is faithfiIJ to 
Bakke s balance, but Grutter is a harder call Justice 0 'Connor for the Court tells us she is 
applying the magic formula of "strict scrutiny," but is she really? The Court splits over 
application of strict scrutiny to Michigan Law School, where the author taught in his youth. His 
Essay teaches what lies at the heart of his institutional mission in class: Magic formulae are no 
substitute for judicial judgment Mat the author sees in Justice O'Connors opinion for the 
Court is a new balance, Grutter s balance, which goes beyond Justice Powell in Bakke. The new 
emphasis on inclusion in Grutter suggests a new weighing of competing interests beyond the 
educational benefits achieved by racial and ethnic diversity in the classroom. This is the end 
approved by Justice Powell in Bakke, but debunked by the competing, strident roars of"Judicial 
Lions''-Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas who are of the Categorical School of 
judicial process. Ironically, the first Justice John Marshall Harlan s categorical imperative, "Our 
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citiZA:ns, "yielded in 
its day to Harlan s own mediating balance in the old Cwnming case, a short three years a/fer 
Justice Har/ans dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson. Justice O'Connors Grutter opinion, drawing 
upon the tool of analogy in the judicial process, speaks of access, opportunity, and inclusion­
an entirely new chord as the author hears it Grutter sounds a new compelling interest and 
weighs the balance anew. Like Justice Powell befiJre her, Justice O'Connor takes the way of 
mediation between Americas past and Americas !Uture. Her method in Gratz and Grutter lies 
at the heart of the Courts judicial process in constitutional law, as the author has grown to 
understand it. Throughout his Essay, the author compares the mediating voice-the voice of 
balance-the voice of Justice PoweU, to the other diverse voices of the Courts judicial 
personahties. In hard cases, there are no absolutes. The Court is at its best in mediating between 
categorical imperatives. This Wt'IS Justice Powells ooy in Bakke. His voice has been heard in 
Gratz and Grutter. The expeninent continues. A sense of neighborhood, a sense of love of 
fellow man, a sense of shared destiny, not race hate, is the authors sense ofGrutter's balance. 
* George M. Armstrong, Jr., Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, 
Louisiana State University. AB., Univ. of Cincinnati; J.D., Harvard Law School. Instructor 
in Law, Univ. Michigan Law School, 1970-71. Judicial Fellow, Sup. Ct U.S., 1975-76; Exec. 
Dir., La. Comm. on Bicentennial of U.S. Const., 1987-91; Scholar in Residence, La. Bar 
Found., 1990-92. Editor, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL BALANCE: A TRIBUTE TO LEWIS F. 
POWELL, JR. (L.S.B.A. 1989). J owe thanks to Ms. Kimberly Dort, my student research 
assistant on tltis "Powell Voice" project, born Newark, New Jersey, of Haitian immigrants, 
B.S. Syracuse University, LSU Law Class of 2005. Ms. Dort's assistance with the books­
packing and hauling them to Our Lady of the Lake Hospital, Baton Rou�e, where these ?otes 
took shape-was beyond the call under trying circumstances. To Cynthia Bland, my Chief of 
Staff at LSU Law Center, I give her a hug for her precious spirit and prayers. Ma kmme, 
Princess Barbara Baier of Gretna, was a rose in my makeshift study at 0. L. 0. L. R. M. C. 
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Our Nation is better off tor it As to twenty-five years hence (Grutter s hope? holding?), to quote 
Justice Powell- "Ui' shall see." 
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Of late, the Fifth Circuit has said that Mr. Justice Powell's Bakke 
balance is dead. I doubt it. The life of the Court and of the Constitution 




Gratz v. Bollingel and Grutter v. Bollinger,3 to my mind, echo the 
soft, mediating voice of Mr. Justice Powell. Bakke's4 balance, if I may 
catch Justice Powell's contribution in a word, mediates between the 
strident, self-assured voice that insists our Constitution is color-blind 
1. Paul R. Baier, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 1907-1998: Remembrances from LSU Law, 
59 LA. L. REv. 409, 410 (1999) ( footnotes omitted). 
2. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
3. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
4. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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and the softer, moderate voice that allows a law school to take race into 
account in composing itself and in staking out its mission. In Justice 
Powell's view, the future of our Nation is at stake.5 The hope is fervent 
that diversity of experience, born in part of color, enriches our classes; 
that to live together, we must know one another; that in the context of 
higher education and in our law schools,  Bakke's balance is best. 
I subscribe to the hope and to the holdings of Gratz and Grutter. 
Rather than mouth the usual formulas of the law-"strict scrutiny," 
"compelling interest"-my aim is to emphasize the vital place of 
judicial personality and judicial method in the life of what inescapably 
appears to me as our living Constitution. 
I. THE PERSONALITY OF THE JUDGE 
Now, by way of thanking the editors of the Tulane Law Review 
for their invitation to "deconstruct" Gratz and Grutter, let me say in all 
candor that I do not like that vogueish word "deconstruct." My job as 
a teacher is to build understanding. 6 Hence, I must leave 
deconstruction to Court watchers whose minds are jackhammers. I 
prefer to start with an insight from Tulane Law School's great friend, 
Judge John Minor Wisdom. 
I first met Judge Wisdom at Mother's Restaurant near the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. It was lunchtime. Judge 
Tate invited me to tag along. I wanted to know from Judge Wisdom 
whether he agreed with a certain proposition of Continental legal 
thought. One o f  the adyantages of teaching law in Louisiana is its link 
to European legal thinkers. Professor Joseph Dainow, John Henry 
Wigmore 's friend at LSU, brought to my attention the Science of Legal 
Method, a comparative collection that puts into English much of 
Europe's enduring juristic ideas.7 Wigmore's volumes opened my eyes 
thirty years ago at LSU Law School, just as it opened Cardozo 's in 
19 17.8 This, in turn, prompted my question. So I gazed into Judge 
5.  Bakke, 438 U.S. at  318. 
6. The locus classicus, to my way of thinking, is Professor Paul A Freund's ON 
UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT(l949). 
7. See SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD: SELECT EsSAYS BY VARIOUS AUTHORS (Ernest 
Bruncken & Layton B. Register trans., 1917). 
8. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). 
Cardozo's immortal Storrs Lectures delivered at Yale University rely heavily upon the 
Continental insights, in English translation, of John Henry Wigmore's The Modem Legal 
Philosophy Series, especially Volume IX, Science of Legal Method, viz.: 
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Wisdom's Catahoula eyes and asked him whether he agreed with the 
proposition that "there is no guarantee of justice." I was cut off 
quickly. "That's Eugen Ehrlich,"9 he exclaimed with glee. Judge 
Wisdom was justly proud of his Tulane learning and was not to be out­
quoted by an LSU law professor. John Minor Wisdom made the 
recitation his own: "There is no guarantee of justice except the 
personality of the judge."10 
Judge Wisdom rendered immediately: "Of course that's true." 
II. OF BAKKE!s BALANCE 
Justice Powell's judicial personality is evidenced throughout his 
lonely opinion in Bakke.11 He was all alone, joined by no other 
Member of the Court. His was the deciding vote between, on the one 
hand, constitutionally sanctioning the use of race in reserving sixteen 
Today a great school of continental jurists is pleading for a still wider freedom of 
adaptation and construction. . . . The judge as interpreter for the community of its 
sense of the law and order must supply omissions, correct uncertainties, and 
harmonize results with justice through a method of free decision-"libre recherche 
scientifique." That is the view of Geny and Ehrlich and Gmelin and others. Courts 
are to "search for light among the social elements of every kind that are the living 
force behind the facts they deal with." The power thus put in their hands is great, 
and subject, like all power, to abuse; but we are not to flinch from granting it. In 
the long run "there is no guaranty of justice," says Ehrlich, "except the personality 
of the judge." The same problems of method, the same contrasts between the letter 
and the spirit, are living problems in our own land and law. Above all in the field 
of constitutional law, the method of free decision has become, I think, the dominant 
one today. The great generalities of the constitution have a content and a 
significance that vary from age to age. The method of free decision sees through 
the transitory particulars and reaches what is permanent behind them. 
Interpretation, thus enlarged, becomes more than the ascertainment of the meaning 
and intent of lawmakers whose collective will has been declared. It supplements 
the declaration, and fills the vacant spaces, by the same processes and methods that 
have built up the customary law. 
CARDOZO, supra, at 16-17 (footnotes omitted). 
9. Austrian legal scholar and teacher (b. 1862, Czernowitz, Austrian Empire; d. May 
2, 1922), credited with founding the discipline of the sociology of law. Ehrlich's sociology of 
law was based on the free-law or sense-of-justice conception formulated in Germany by 
Hermann Kantorowicz. Ehrlich's major work, Gmndlegung der Soziologie des Rechts, was 
translated into English as EUGEN EHRLICH, F'uNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
LAW (1936). 
l 0. EUGEN EHRLICH, FREIE RECHTSFINDUNG UND FREIE RECHTSWISSENCHAIT (Ernest 
Bruncken trans., 1903), reprinted in part in IX SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD, supra note 8, at 
47, 65, quoted in Paul R. Baier, Mr. Justice Blackmun: Reflections from the Cours Mirabeau, 
43 AM. U. L. REv. 707, 710 (1994). 
11. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269 (1978) (opinion of 
Powell, J., announcing the judgment of the court). 





Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., c. 1986 
Photographer: Ken Heinen 
Reproduced from the 
Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States 
1959 
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seats out of a hundred for minority medical school students at the 
University of California at Davis, and, on the other, statutorily 
condemning race discrimination, simpliciter, under section 60 I of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1 964;12 Justice Powell's view was that Title VI's 
seemingly absolute prohibition against race discrimination "must be 
read against the background of both the problem that Congress was 
addressing and the broader view of the statute that emerges from a full 
examination of the legislative debates."13 Thus, "[t]here simply was no 
reason for Congress to consider the validity of hypothetical 
preferences that might be accorded minority citizens; the legislators 
were dealing with the real and pressing problem of how to guarantee 
those citizens equal treatment."14 Of course, Justice Powell's reading of 
section 60 I is  anathema to those who insist upon "plain meaning." 
Four of his colleagues disagreed with him on the statutory question.15 
But Justice Powell's search for purpose and context is a hallmark of his 
judicial ways and of great judging. Anyone familiar with the hundreds 
of articles on affirmative action16 would have to agree with Justice 
Powell's observation that the concepts of "discrimination" and "equal 
12. ''No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national 
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). 
13. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 285. 
14. Id 
15. Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart, Justice Stevens, and Justice Rehnquist. T he 
Justices who approved affirmative action also numbered four-Justice Brennan, Justice 
White, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun. Together they found that Title VI and the 
Fourteenth Amendment permitted adoption of race-conscious means to overcome past 
societal discrimination. Thus, says Professor J. Harvie Wilkinson ill, 
Bakke's noted compromise was largely the making of the Court's "ninth man." 
Between the statutory foursome of Burger, Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist, and 
the permissive foursome of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun was Justice 
Powell. "Powell took his position at the outset and never got anyone to go along 
with him," one Court insider was quoted as saying. 
To some, Powell's vote came as a surprise . .  Yet the result was typical of 
Powell the diplomat, Powell the balancer, Powell the quiet man of the middle way. 
J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE. THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL 
INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 301 (1979). 
16. Eg., Terrance Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political 
Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. Cm. L. REV. 653 (1975); William Van Alstyne, 
Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 775 
( 1979); Samuel Issacharoff, Can Affinnative Action Be De/ended?, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 664 
(1998). 
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protection" are susceptible of varying interpretations.11 At this point, 
Justice Powell quoted Holmes's aper9us that a word or phrase "is the 
skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content 
according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used."18 
Holmes is weighty authority in my book of judicial process. So much, 
then, for section 601. "In view of the clear legislative intent, Title VI 
must be held to proscribe only those racial classifications that would 
violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment."19 It is 
significant to note that Congress and the Executive Branch have relied 
on Justice Powell's purposive interpretation for twenty-five years up to 
Gratz and Grutter. Indeed, Congress has specifically rejected 
legislative proposals to make section 601 colorblind along the lines of 
California's Proposition 209. 20 
As to the guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice 
Powell's Bakke balance, paradoxically, first enforces an absolute: The 
Equal Protection Clause protects persons not groups; it affords 
individuals, including Allan Bakke, equal protection of the laws 
17. After quoting the language of section 601, which, like that of the Equal 
Protection Clause, "is majestic in its sweep," Justice Powell observed: 
The concept of "discrimination," like the phrase "equal protection of the laws," is 
susceptible of varying interpretations, for as Mr. Justice Holmes declared, "[a] 
word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought 
and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the 
time in which it is used." 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 284 (quoting Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918)). 
For an especially pungent academic exchange apropos the meaning of "discrimination," 
see Arnold H. Loewy, Taking Bakke Senously: Distinguishing Diversity from Affirmative 
ActJon in the Law School Admissions Process, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1479 (1999), and Professor 
Lino A. Graglia's roaring response, Professor Loewy:S "Diversity" Defense of Racial 
Preference: Defining DiscriminatJon Away, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1505, 1524 (1999) ("Unless, 
therefore, Loewy's proposal is to be like Justice Powell's-merely a cover for fraud-his 
earnest pleading and logical acrobatics will be to no avail."). 
The best discussion I have read of the "newspeak" of "reverse discrimination" is from 
the poignant pen of Paul M. Gaston, of the University of Virginia Faculty: "[I)t is hard not to 
fmd something grotesque in the claim of a moral equivalency between two diametrically 
opposed realities. It strains credulity to believe anyone can actually believe that affirmative 
action and white supremacy are occupants of a common bed of evil." Paul M. Gaston, 
Reflections on Affmnative Action: Its Origins, Virtues, Enemies, Champions, and Prospects, 
in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 277, 287 
(Gary Orfield ed., 2001) [hereinafter DIVERSITY CHALLENGED). 
18. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 284 (quoting Towne, 245 U.S. at 425 (Holmes, J. )). 
19. Id at 287. 
20. For a discussion of the government's affinnative action measures, see Jed 
Rubenfeld, AffmnativeAction, l 07YALE L.J. 427 (1997). 
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regardless of color.21 "The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean 
one thing when applied to one individual and something else when 
applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same 
protection, then it is not equal."22 This is judicial vision as I know it in 
the um·ted States Reports. 
I am reminded of the opening part of Justice Powell's judicial 
oath: "I will administer justice without respect to persons."23 The 
purported distinction between a goal of minority representation and a 
racial quota was brushed aside as semantics. White applicants could 
compete for only 84 seats, rather than the 100 open to minority 
applicants. This is a line drawn on the basis of race and Justice Powell 
was unwilling to relax judicial review: "Racial and ethnic distinctions 
of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting 
judicial examination."24 
Justice Powell's grasp of the Court's evolving precedents over 
thirty years led him to reject the University's plea that discrimination 
against whites is not suspect if its purpose is benign. 25 This would not 
do. "The clock of our liberties, however, cannot be turned back to 
l 868."26 I sense another defining element of Mr. Justice Powell. The 
majestic guarantee of equal protection is not fettered to the broken 
chains of slavery. Equal protection evolves over time. Equal 
protection embraces all persons, white or black. 
Justice Powell's Bakke opinion reminds me of Justice Brandeis's 
judicial work ways: "Master of both the microscope and telescope."21 
Justice Powell is attentive to small details of fact, while at the same 
time insisting upon principled constitutional judgment. He sees 
serious problems of justice raised by racial preferences. Surely there 
are. "Nothing in the Constitution supports the notion that individuals 
may be asked to suffer otherwise impermissible burdens in order to 
enhance the societal standing of their ethnic groups."28 "[P]referential 
programs may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain 





Appointment of Mr. Justice Powell, 404 U.S. xi, xi-xiii ( 1972) (reciting the oath 
m its entrrety). 
24. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291. 
25. Id at 295. 
26. Id 
27. Charles E. Hughes, Mr. Justice Brandeis, in MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS I, 3 (Felix 
Frankfurter ed., 1932). 
28. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298. 
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groups are unable to achieve success without special protection based 
on a factor having no relationship to individual worth."29 "[T]here is a 
measure of inequity in forcing innocent persons in [ Bakke's] position 
to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their making."30 
"Disparate constitutional tolerance of such classifications well may 
serve to exacerbate racial and ethnic antagonisms rather than alleviate 
them."31 
Justice Powell's Bakke opinion builds on the large grasp of 
Louisiana's only Supreme Court Justice, Edward Douglass White. 
This pleases me. 32 E. D. White's dissent in the old Pollock v. Fanners' 
Loan & Trust Co. case33 rejects the notion of the mutability of 
29. Id 
30. Id 
31. Id at 298-99. 
32. Louisiana's Edward Douglass White, sadly, is largely a forgotten figure in the 
minds of contemporary students of the Constitution, including mine, who when asked are 
unable to identify the oil portrait of Chief Justice White that I keep in my office. By way of 
penance, they must read my article Edward Douglass White: Frame for a Portrait, 43 LA. L. 
REv. 999 (1983). Holmes and White, having fought against one another on opposite sides in 
the Civil War-Holmes in Union Blue, White in Confederate Gray-later sat side by side as 
Brothers on the Supreme Court of the States: 
In fitting accord two men taken out of the heart and turmoil of American history 
sat in the middle chair and a Union soldier on his left. On some anniversary, I 
forget what, perhaps one ofHolmes's wounds, the Chief Justice would bring him a 
red rose to be pinned on his robe. Chief Justice White was not a great Chief 
Justice, but a beloved figure. 
DEAN ACHESON, MORNING AND NOON 59 ( 1965). 
I have done my part to preserve White's memory, indeed putting him on the stage with 
Justice Holmes and Brandeis in the living room at 1720 I Street, Washington, D.C., Holmes's 
home. ACT III, "At Home," appears in the Summer 1998 edition of Litigation. See Paul R. 
Baier, The Blue and Gray as One: Holmes and U1v'te on the Supreme Cowt, LITIGATION, 
Summer 1998, at 76. A preview of the play is published in Paul R. Baier, "FATHER CHIEF 
JUSITCE" ED. U1v'te and the Constitution, A P lay, 58 LA. L. REv. 423 (1998). Most 
recently, "Father Chief Justice" played at Louisiana's Old State Capitol, April 29, 2000, as 
part of the Baton Rouge Bar Association's AB.A. award-winning Law Day celebration. 
Justice Harry  T. Lemmon of the Louisiana Supreme Court (retired) plays the lead role as 
Chief Justice White. I play the role of the narrator, Professor Richard Henry Jesse, first 
Academic Dean of the University of Louisiana (now Tulane University ), who in his day was a 
close personal friend of Chief Justice White. 
33. See 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (holding unconstitutional a direct tax void for want of 
apportionment, including the Income Tax Act of August 15, 1894, as levied a tax upon rents 
or income from real property), overruled by South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 ( 1988). 
The Court was equally divided upon the validity of a tax on income from personal property. 
Justice White's dissent was not only his first dissenting opinion, but also his first important 
opinion upon any grave constitutional question. T hose charged with remembering White by 
his written words selected the following connected passages from his first Pollock dissent to 
affix to Mr. P. Bryant Baker's great bronze statue of Chief Justice White: 
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constitutional principle based on shifting political and social 
judgments, as this would foreclose consistent application of the 
Constitution from one generation to the next. Professor Archibald Cox 
says the same thing in his book, The Role of che Supreme Court in 
Amencan Government34 Quite judiciously, Justice Powell quotes the 
professor's book in rejecting the same professor's elastic arguments, as 
counsel on the brief and at oral argument, in the Bakke case. 35 This is 
judicial statesmanship, you can be sure. 
Deft handling of precedents is required. Justice Powell has 
obvious command of the landscape: "(W]e have never approved 
preferential classifications in the absence of proved constitutional or 
statutory violations."36 Lau v. Mcho/11 and Umted Jewish 
Organizations of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey8 are carefully 
distinguished. One standard, and one standard alone, governs the 
Court's equal protection review. If the University's purpose is to assure 
some specified percentage of minority students in its student body 
"merely because of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential 
purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial but as facially invalid."39 
"Preferring members of any one group for no reason other than race or 
ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake. This the Constitution 
Te ac h t he le sson that se ttle d principle s may be o ver thrown at any time , an d 
con fusion an d turmoil must ul ti mately re sul t. . . . T he fundamen t al concep tion o f  a 
judic ial bo dy i s  that o f  one he dge d abo ut by prece den ts w hic h are bin ding on the 
co urt wi t ho ut reg ar d  to the pe rson ali ty o f  i ts me mber s. Bre ak down this bel ie f  in 
judic ial con t inui ty , an d le t it be felt that . . .  this co urt i s  to dep art fro m the se ttle d 
conc lusion s o f  i ts pre dece sso rs ,  an d to de ter mine the m all acco rding to the mere 
op inion o f  tho se w ho te mpo rarily fill i ts benc h, an d o ur Con stitution wil l . . . be 
bere ft o f  val ue and beco me a mo st dangero us i nstrumen t to the rig hts an d li ber tie s 
o f  the people. 
Id at 650-52 (White , J., dissen ting ). 
34. ARCHIBALD Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 
(1976). 
35. The Co ur t 's ro le , said Jus tice Powell , i s  to disce rn "pr inc iple s suffic ien tly 
abso lute to g ive the m roo ts thro ug ho ut the co mmuni ty an d con tin uity o ver signi fic ant pe rio ds 
o f  ti me ,  an d to li ft the m abo ve the le ve l  o f  t he pr agmatic po litical judg ments o f  a p ar tic ul ar 
ti me an d pl ace ." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 (in te rnal quo t ation s o mi tte d) (quo ting Cox, supra 
no te 34, at 114). 
36. Id at 302. 
37. 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
38. 430 U.S. 144 (1977). "[U]nl ike Lau and United Jewish Organizations, there has 
been no de ter min ation by the legi slature or a re spon sible admin istrati ve agency that the 
Uni vers ity eng age d i n  a di sc ri min atory p rac tice re quir ing re me dial e ffor t s." Bakke, 438 U.S. 
at 305. 
39. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307. 
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forbids.""° Careful assessment of the University's other purposes 
resulted in Justice Powell rejecting all but one of them. One excerpt 
from his separate opinion is enough to show Justice Powell's telescopic 
mastery: 
[T]he purpose of helping certain groups whom the faculty of the Davis 
Medical School perceived as victims of "societal discrimination" does 
not justify a classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons like 
respondent, who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the 
beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have 
suffered. To hold otherwise would be to convert a remedy heretofore 
reserved for violations of legal rights into a privilege that all institutions 
throughout the Nation could grant at their pleasure to whatever groups 
are perceived as victims of societal discrimination. That is a step we 
have never approved."1 
Strict attention to the record is another hallmark of a great judge. 
Virtually no evidence in the record indicated that the University's 
special admissions program was either needed or geared to improve 
delivery of health care to underserved minority communities. 
The fourth goal of the University was the attainment of a diverse 
student body. "This clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an 
institution of higher education.'"'2 Justice Powell's Bakke balance 
addresses a competing interest: "The freedom of a university to make 
its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student 
body.""3 The First Amendment, as interpreted by Justice Powell's 
former teacher, Professor (later Justice) Felix Frankfurter,"" supplies an 
40. Id 
41. Id at 310. 
42. Jdat311-12. 
43. Jdat312. 
44. Justice Powell earned an LL.M. after a year of post-graduate study at the Harvard 
Law School in 1932: 
The curriculum, the facilities, and the faculty were, as everyone now knows, 
hopelessly old-fashioned. Thomas Reed Powell held forth in Constitutional Law, 
Felix Frankfurter in Administrative Law and Federal Jurisdiction, Roscoe Pound in 
Jurisprudence. What everyone may not have discovered is that there was no solid 
line of fire from those battlements; there was enough crossfire to keep the students 
engaged and alert. When Professor F rankfurter was told that on some 
constitutional issue Professor Powell had taken an opposite position, Frankfurter 
responded, "Good! You invite Powell to come to our seminar next week and we'll 
have it out." When the invitation was duly conveyed, Powell answered, "Why 
should I debate Felix in his seminar. He thinks twice as fast as I dcr-and not half 
as straight." 
As a member of Lewis Powell's postgraduate class, and his steady admirer 
from that time forth, I should like to think that the postgraduate year was a 
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accommodating doctrinal root.45 Bakke's balance, as voiced by Justice 
Powell, also respects an empirical judgment of educational experience: 
The atmosphere of "speculation, experiment and creation"-so 
essential to the quality of higher education-is widely believed to be 
promoted by a diverse student body. As the Court noted in Keyishian, it 
is not too much to say that the "nation's future depends upon leaders 
trained through wide exposure" to the ideas and mores of students as 
diverse as this Nation of many peoples.46 
Whether diversity in fact achieves these goals is subject to 
strident debate. But Justice Powell's tempered way required that he 
respect the educational judgment of the University. The University, 
however, cannot go overboard: "[T]he question remains whether the 
program's racial classification is necessary to promote this interest.'"'' 
With this, Bakke's balance is cut finer and finer. This is judging with a 
scalpel, not a sledgehammer. The University's program was seriously 
flawed: 
It is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified 
percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to be members of 
selected ethnic groups, with the rema1mng percentage an 
undifferentiated aggregation of students. The diversity that furthers a 
compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of 
formative influence in his professional life, that somehow it contributed to those 
qualities of fair-mindedness, openness, candor and comprehensiveness, to that 
combination of intellectual rigor and human sensitivity, that characterize Justice 
Powell. But to speak in this way of influences is to minimize the role of the 
individual himself It is not so much a question of influence as of affinity-or, as 
the wise saying has it, "If you would carry back the wealth of the Indies, you must 
bring the wealth of the Indies with you." 
Paul A. Freund, Foreword· Justice Powell-The Meaning of Moderation, 68 VA. L. REv. 169 
(1982). Joseph Lash writes: 
[T]hey said of Frankfurter, as he said of Ames, that with him "you took not courses 
but the man." He put on a theatrical performance before his classes, said David 
Lilienthal. He was a man "who could read the dictionary and make it exciting," as 
he bounced around, spending hours on one aspect of one case, so that his courses 
came to be known as "the case-of-the-month" clubs. 
Joseph P. Lash, A Brahmin of the Law: A Biographical Essay, in FROM TIIE DIARIES OF FELIX 
FRANKFURTER 3, 36 (Joseph P. Lash ed., 1975). 
45. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring 
in result); accordKeyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State ofN.Y, 385 U.S. 589 
(1967). 
46. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13 (footnote omitted). 
47. Id at 314-15. 
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qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but 
a single though important element.48 
The University 's special admissions program, "focused solely on 
ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine 
diversity."49 Mr. Justice Powell knows when and where to place his 
emphasis. He does so sparingly. Only one other word is italicized in 
his 152-page opinion in Bakke-. "It is far too late to argue that the 
guarantee of equal protection to all persons permits the recognition of 
special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that 
accorded others.''50 
Harvard College's Admissions Program, by contrast, was Justice 
Powell's model of a balanced program that considers race as one 
factor, among others, in composing a diverse college class. What was 
key for Justice Powell is that a race conscious admissions program 
must treat "each applicant as an individual in the admissions 
process."51 His formulation was linked to his ideal of the scope of 
equal protection. The "fatal flaw" in the University's program "is its 
disregard of individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.''52 
Justice Powell's Bakke balance concludes: 
The applicant who loses out on the last available seat to another 
candidate receiving a "plus" on the basis of ethnic background will not 
have been foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply because 
he was not the right color or had the wrong surname. It would mean 
only that his combined qualifications, which may have included similar 
nonobjective factors, did not outweigh those of the other applicant. His 
qualifications would have been weighed fairly and competitively, and 
he would have no basis to complain of unequal treatment under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.53 
48. Id at 3 1 5. 
49. Id 
50. Id at 295. 
5 1 .  Id at318. 
52. Id at 320. 
53. Id at3 1 8. 
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As I see it, this is a careful, moderate approach. 54 Justice Powell 's 
Bakke balance mediates between absolute colorblindness and 
"competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin"55 in the 
composition of our nation's institutions of higher education. As in all 
judgments resolving what the late Professor Paul Freund calls 
"constitutional dilemmas,"56 value is balanced against value, judicial 
choice is kept as narrow as possible between competing interests 
painstakingly weighed. 57 
The tools of government must not be too blunt. But a judicial 
measure of caution, and of deference, on review is the wiser course. 
Justice Powell  acknowledged risks of subterfuge, but he presumed the 
University's good faith. His opinion draws fine lines, but he defends 
them with the wisdom of his former teacher, Justice Frankfurter.58 "A 
boundary line . . .  is none the worse for being narrow."59 
Of Justice Powell, Professor Paul Freund said: "Again and again, 
explicitly and implicitly, Justice Powell has sought a more measured 
justice by attending to the complexities, the nuances and gradations, of 
a controversy.''6° Measured justice, I have tried to show, is Bakke's 
balance. Justice Powell was all alone in Bakke. For myself, I think of 
what Holmes once said: "Only when you have worked alone,-when 
54. "A treasure that has remained conspicuously with Justice Powell is the gift of 
moderation." Freund, supra note 44, at 1 69. Professor Freund quotes the seventeenth-century 
English divine Thomas Fuller: "Once in an age the moderate man is in fashion[.] Each 
extreme courts him, to make them friends; and surely he hath a great advantage to be a Peace­
maker betwixt opposite parties." THOMAS FULLER, THE HOLY STATE AND THE PROFANE STATE 
207 (Maximilian GraffWalten ed., 1 938). 
55. Bakke, at 320 . 
56. Paul A. Freund, Constitutional Dilemmas, 45 B.U. L. REv. 13, 20 ( 1 965): 
Equal protection, not color blindness, is the constitutional mandate, and the 
experience with liberty of contract should caution against an absolute legal 
criterion that ignores practical realities. Measures to correct racial imbalance are 
like those to correct an imbalance in the bargaining position of labor. At least as 
transitional measures they may serve to promote, not to deny, the equal protection 
of the laws. 
57.  Reviewing Justice Powell's earliest work on the Court, Professor Gerald Gunther 
considered Lewis F Powell's performance "especially heartening." "[H)e already reveals the 
single most important trait for responsible 'balancing' :  the capacity to identify and evaluate 
separately each analytically distinct ingredient of the contending interests." Gerald Gunther, 
The Supreme Court, 197 I Tenn, Foreword· In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing 
Court: A Model JOr a Newer Equal Protection, 8 6  HARV. L. REV. l ,  7 ( 1 972). 
58. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 3 1 8. 
59. Id (internal quotations omitted) (quoting McLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U.S. 327, 329 
( 1 944) (Frankfurter, J.)). 
60. Freund, supm note 44, at 1 72. 
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you have felt around you a black gulf of solitude more isolating than 
that which surrounds the dying man, and in hope and in despair have 
trusted to your own unshaken will,-then only will you have 
achieved.''61 
ill. GRATZAND GRUITER 
On the one hand, Gratz rejects the University of Michigan's 
minority admissions program.62 The Court, in an opinion written by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, relies on Justice Powell 's Bakke balance.63 On 
the other hand, Grutter approves the University of Michigan Law 
School's program, crafted along different, more moderate, lines.64 
Justice O'Connor writes for the majority. Her vote is decisive in these 
split, five-to-four, decisions. In Gratz and Grutter, following Justice 
Powell's admired example,65 Justice O' Connor takes the middle way. 
She takes the way of Bakke's balance. 
Or does she really? 
A. Gratz v. Bollinger 
Certainly Gratz is no problem. Chief Justice Rehnquist knocks 
out the University of Michigan's twenty-point system as gross race 
discrimination.66 Both the Chief Justice's majority opinion and Justice 
O'Connor's separate concurring opinion, if I may speak my faith, 
"consist with the letter and spirit''67 of Justice Powell's voice. As to the 
letter of Bakke, the Chief Justice condemns the University's policy 
because it "automatically distributes 20 points, or one-fifth of the 
points needed to guarantee admission, to every single 
'underrepresented minority' applicant solely because of race.''68 
6 1 .  3 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Profession of the Law, in THE CoLLECTED 
WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES 47 1 ,  472-73 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995). 
62. 539 U.S. 244, 280-8 1 (2003). 
63. Id at 28 1 .  
64. 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003). 
65. Justice O'CoIUlor's new book THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE has an entire chapter on Lewis F Powell, Jr., and Justice O'Co1U1or's 
admiration shines through. See SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: 
REFLECTIONS OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 147-50 (Craig Joyce ed., 2003). The photograph 
of "Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Associate Justice, 1 972-1987," facing page 149 brings back 
fond memories. 
66. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 285-86. 
67. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 3 1 6, 42 1 ( 1 8 1 9). 
68. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268. 
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Fundamentally, Michigan 's twenty-point system conflicts with Justice 
Powell's opinion in Bakke, which 
emphasized the importance of considering each particular applicant as 
an individual, assessing all of the qualities that individual possesses, and 
in turn, evaluating that individual 's abil ity to contribute to the unique 
setting of higher education. The admissions program Justice Powell 
described, however, did not contemplate that any single characteristic 
automatically ensured a specific and identifiable contribution to a 
university's diversity.69 
As to following the spirit o f  Bakke, as to following the generous 
sensitivity of Lewis Powell, Justice O 'Connor shows herself of the 
same voice: "Even the most outstanding national high school leader 
could never receive more than five points for his or her 
accomplishments-a mere quarter o f  the points automatically assigned 
to an underrepresented minority solely based on the fact of his or her 
race."10 "[T]he selection index, by setting up automatic, predetermined 
point allocations for the soft variables, ensures that the diversity 
contributions of applicants cannot be individually assessed."11 Looking 
to the future, as judges must look to the future, Justice O'Connor 
invites the University "to modify its system" so that it affords "the 
necessary individualized consideration."12 Justice O'Connor's second 
to last sentence in her Gratz opinion is telling: "But the current 
system, as I understand it, is a nonindividualized, mechanical one."13 
Judgment on the Court, I emphasize in class, is necessarily 
personal. Each justice is sworn to decide cases, "according to the best 
of my abilities and understanding" and "agreeably to the 
Constitution."14 Every justice, I am sure, takes the weighty 
responsibility seriously. In Lewis Powell 's words: "Every justice is 
ever conscious of that responsibility."75 
Ultimately, application of Bakke in Gratz and Grutter involves 
inescapable judgment. The paradox of Gratz and Grutter is that 
justices on both sides of the Court's split-fence rely on Justice Powell's 
69. Id 
70. Id at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
7 1 .  I d  (O'Connor, J. ,  concurring). 
72. Id at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
73. Id (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
74. See, e.g., Appointmen t of Mr. Jus tice Powell, 404 U.S. xi, xi-xiii (1 972) (reciting 
the o ath in i ts en tire ty). 
7 5. See B aier, supra no te 1 ,  at 41 1 .  
2004] THE VOICE OF JUSTICE PO WELL 197 1  
opinion in Bakke. Perhaps the justices asked themselves, as I have 
wondered myself, what would Lewis F. Powell, Jr. say? 
For the Court's majority in Gratz, and for Justice O' Connor 
concurring separately, the blunt allocation of twenty points out of a 
hundred based on race simply goes too far. 76 This is a judgment that 
follows Justice Powell's voice in Bakke, as I hear it. 
B. Grutter v. Bollinger 
Grutter, on the other hand, is a harder call. The Court's opinion 
purports to follow Bakke's balance.77 Mr. Justice Powell is all over 
Justice O' Connor's opinion for the Court in Grutter. The fit is tight. 
The Law School's program of minority admissions, says Justice 
O' Connor, is exactly the model that Justice Powell voiced twenty-five 
years earlier in Bakke. Thus: "Like the Harvard plan, the Law 
School's admissions policy 'is flexible enough to consider all pertinent 
elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each 
applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration, 
although not necessarily according them the same weight.' "78 Again: 
"We also find that, like the Harvard plan Justice Powell referenced in 
Bakke, the Law School's race-conscious admissions program 
adequately ensures that all factors that may contribute to student body 
diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race in admissions 
decisions."79 
From these excerpts, the conclusion seems inexorable that 
Grutter, like Gratz, echoes the voice of Justice Powell. The University 
of Michigan Law School not only modeled its minority admissions 
program after the Harvard plan, but the Court is satisfied that the 
record of the fifteen-day bench trial in Grutter shows the Law School 
also administered its program in accordance with Justice Powell's view 
of equal protection.80 
Not so at all, according to Chief Justice Rehnquist's mastery of 
the microscope. His Grutter dissent is sharp: "Stripped of its 'critical 
mass' veil, the Law School's program is revealed as a naked effort to 
76. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 283. 
77. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-29 (2003). 
78. Id at 338 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 
(1978)). 
79. Id 
80. Id at 338. 
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achieve racial balancing."81 The tight correlation between the 
percentage of African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans in 
the applicant pool and the percentage of admitted applicants who are 
members of these groups-"is far too precise to be dismissed as 
merely the result of the school pay ing 'some attention to [the] 
numbers."'82 The Law School's disparate admissions practices with 
respect to these minority groups "demonstrate that its alleged goal of 
'critical mass' is simply a sham."83 From Chief Justice Rehnquist's 
statistical tables, we are invited to adjudge the University of Michigan 
Law School guilty of "careful race based planning."84 Say s the Chief 
Justice: "I do not believe that the Constitution gives the Law School 
such free rein in the use of race."85 Nor does Justice Kennedy, who 
accuses the . maj ority of ignoring reality : "[T]he concept of critical 
mass is a delusion used by the Law School to mask its attempt to make 
race an automatic factor in most instances and to achieve numerical 
goals indistinguishable from quotas."86 
I have no doubt that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy 
are sincere in their convictions. But, if I may add a personal note, their 
joint condemnation of Michigan Law School's minorities admissions 
. . 
program gives me pam. 
Why the pain? 
I started my teaching career at Michigan Law School a generation 
ago thanks to Doug Kahn. I was a lowly Instructor in Law perched 
literally in an ivy-t wined tower. I heard Yale Kamisar's booming voice 
for the first time at a faculty meeting. I heard Francis Allen's87 soft 
voice welcome me to his home on Lakehaven Drive. Judicial 
condemnation of the University of Michigan Law School ,  its faculty, 
its deans, its administrators, hits me hard. I thirik of Daniel Webster's 
plea before Chief Justice Marshall in the Dartmouth College case: "It 
is, Sir, as I have said, a small College. And yet there are those who 
love It"88 Again, I wonder, what Justice Powell would say if he were 
8 1 .  I d  at 364 (Relmquist, C.J., dissenting). 
82. Id at 367 (Relmquist, C.J., dissenting) (alteration in original). 
83. Id (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
84. Id at 369 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
85. Id (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
86. Id at 3 7 1  (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
87. Francis A. Allen, Dean, University of Michigan Law School, 1 966-197 1 .  
. 88. Trs. �f Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 5 1 8  ( 1 8 19). Mr. Webster's unmortal peroration does not appear in Henry Wheaton's report of the decision, but was 
p�eserved for all by Chauncy A. Goodrich, a professor at Yale College, who made a special 
tnp to the Supreme Court to hear Webster argue the cause of Dartmouth College before Chief 
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called down to deconstruct Gratz and Gruttefi. Of two things, I am 
sure. First, he would not like the word "deconstruct." He would insist 
that the task be left to legal scholars, in whom Justice Powell had an 
abiding faith. 89 Second, his deference to educators, his refusal to 
overrule their reasoned judgments, his trust in their sincerity and good 
faith-all are part of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.'s judicial personality. 
To me, Gratz and Grutter show that his voice endures. Justice Powell's 
model of justice, as I see it, reconciles the Court's split decisions. I 
have no doubt that his figure, as well as his precedent, was in the mind 
of Justice O'Connor when she labored over these cases. 
What comes to my mind, as I ponder the paradox of Gratz and 
Gmtter, is what Holmes used to say about the need for flexibility in the 
joints of the machine. And I can't help but believe that the soft voice 
of Justice Powell counsels restraint before the Court condemns as liars 
and cheats the Law School's Dean (Jeffery Lehman), its Directors of 
Admissions (Dennis Shields and Erica Munzel), and its Chair of the 
faculty committee that drafted the admissions policy (Professor 
Richard Lempert), as well as the expert witnesses who testified on the 
Law School's behalf. This, I daresay, goes too far. 
In one important particular, Justice O ' Connor's rehearsal of the 
testimony of the fifteen-day bench-trial in Gruttercatches my eye-the 
testimony of Barbara Grutter's expert witness, Dr. Kinley Larntz.90 
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion notes that, "Dr. Lamtz conceded, 
however, that race is not the predominant factor in the Law School's 
admissions calculus."91 This is more evidence of Justice O'Connor's 
use of Justice Brandeis's painstaking microscopic analysis. Good faith 
Justice Marshall, Justice Joseph Story, and others. Goodrich's account, in turn, is quoted by 
Rufus Choate in his eulogy on Daniel Webster. Rufus Choate, Remarks Before the Circuit 
Court on the Death of Mr. Webster, reproduced jn ADDRESSES AND ORATIONS OF RUFUS 
CHOATE 222 (2d ed. 1 878). 
89. Justice Powell liked the connotations of the word "scholar": 
[W]hen he termed someone that, he had paid an honest compliment. He once told 
me he had been offered a professorship in law at the University of Virginia, which 
he had in the end declined, though not without regrets. But he sought what he 
termed "scholarly attributes" in opinion writing, a meticulous care in 
understanding and stating the facts of a case, painstaking research into its 
background, honest and in-context citation of precedent and authority, and a search 
for a principled solution to problems, together with an abjurence of the polemical 
and propagandistic. 
J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, SERVING JUSTICE: A SUPREME COURT CLERK'S VIEW 92 ( 1 974). 
90. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327. 
91 .  Id 
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on the part of Dean Lehman and his Michigan Law School colleagues 
is presumed under Bakke's balance. Justice O 'Connor makes good 
use of the presumption. I have no doubt of the sincerity of her 
convictions either. Justice Powell 's voice, I am sure, guided her twice 
in Gratz and Gruffer. 
But there is more to Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in 
Gruffer than an echo of Bakke's balance. A subtle nuance of her own 
making emerges from the Court's opinion in Gruffer. She adds a new 
weight to the balance, as I read her opinion: namely the Court's 
emphasis on the value of inclusion and opportunity in our law schools. 
This goes beyond the diversity weight of Bakke's balance. The scales 
of justice are tipped anew. Before I explain what I mean, I must turn to 
the clash over strict scrutiny evident in Gmtzand Gruffer. 
IY. RACE DISCRIMINATION, STRICT SCRUTINY, AND JUDICIAL 
JUDGMENT 
Of course, the usual formulae of the law of race discrimination 
and equal protection are all over the competing opinions of the Justices 
in Gratz and Gruffer. But magic formulae, I tell my students, are no 
substitute for inescapable judicial judgment. The same thing is true of 
what I understand is happening in these split decisions. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Gruffer insists that, "[b ]efore 
the Court's decision today, we consistently applied the same strict 
scrutiny analysis regardless of the government's purported reason for 
using race and regardless of the setting in which race was being 
used."92 To prove his point, the Chief Justice quotes from-guess?­
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena.93 And Chief Justice Rehnquist, invoking the voice of 
Justice Powell, adds: "We likewise rejected calls to apply more lenient 
review based on the particular setting in which race i s  being used. 
Indeed, even in the specific context of higher education, we 
emphasized that "constitutional limitations protecting individual rights 
may not be disregarded."94 
Justice Kennedy's dissent in Gruffer is adamant: Justice Powell's 
formula of strict scrutiny in Bakke has been abandoned by the Court 
92. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 364-65 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
93. See id (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 
5 15  U.S. 200, 226 (1995)). 
94. Id at 365 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 3 14). 
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and has been replaced with a unitary formulation.95 The opinion of 
Justice Powell states the correct rule for resolving this case, but the 
Court does not apply strict scrutiny, and according to Justice Kennedy, 
"[b ]y trying to say otherwise, it undermines both the test and its own 
controlling precedents."96 What is Justice O'Connor's answer to these 
assertions? 
First, as to ends, Justice O'Connor for the Court rejects the 
categorical imperative: "Although all governmental uses of race are 
subject to strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it."97 Thus, "[t]oday, 
we hold that the Law School has a compelling interest in attaining a 
diverse student body.''98 Justice Powell's weighing and balancing of 
twenty-five years ago-"all alone"-is now the controlling law of the 
Equal Protection Clause. The Fifth Circuit's Hopwood v. Texas 
decision,99 I tell my students, is dead. 
As to ends, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy have no 
quarrel. Their disagreement over application of strict scrutiny goes to 
the means employed. Says the Chief Justice: "Although the Court 
recites the language of our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of 
that review is unprecedented in its deference."100 The Chief Justice's 
dissent concludes:  "Here the means actually used are forbidden by the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution."101 Says Justice Kennedy: 
"(T]he Court takes the first part of Justice Powell's rule but abandons 
the second."102 The last paragraph in Justice Kennedy's dissent in 
Grutter has a sentence that is striking to my eye: "It is regrettable the 
Court's important holding allowing racial minorities to have their 
special circumstances considered in order to improve their educational 
opportunities is accompanied by a suspension of the strict scrutiny 
which was the predicate of allowing race to be considered in the first 
place."103 I have italicized the word "opportunities' in Justice 
95. Id at 370 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
96. Id (Kennedy J., dissenting). 
97. Id at 33 1 .  
98. Id at 332. 
99. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945 (5th Cir. J 996) ("[T]here has been no 
indication from the Supreme Court, other than Justice Powell's lonely opinion in Bakke, that 
the state's interest in diversity constitutes a compelling justification for governmental race­
based discrimination. Subsequent Supreme Court caselaw strongly suggests, in fact, that it is 
not."). 
100. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 366 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
101. Id at 370 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
102. Id (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
103. Id at 375 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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Kennedy's telling sentence so that I might, in turn, emphasize a point 
of my own. There is nothing in Bakke's balance, as Justice Powell 
voiced it, about the goal of using race to improve the educational 
opportunities of racial minorities. This brings us back to Justice 
O'Connor's adding a weight of her own to Grottels balance. 
Nowhere in Justice Powell 's 1 52-page opinion in Bakke is there 
any reference to the goal of inclusion, to the goal of opening the door 
of opportunity to racial minorities, who live under our Constitution and 
who share the aspirations all of us hold dear. This was an important 
goal of the University of California Regents in the Bakke case, as 
Professor Paul Mishkin told the Court in his Boalt Hall brief.104 
Harvard Law School's Professor Archibald Cox, who I mentioned 
earlier argued the Regents' case in the Supreme Court, was of counsel 
on the Regents' brief. In Bakke, these eminent lawyers opened their 
brief by telling the Court: "The outcome of this controversy will 
decide for future decades whether blacks, Chicanos and other insular 
minorities are to have meaningful access to higher education and real 
opportunities to enter the learned professions, or are to be penalized 
indefinitely by the disadvantages flowing from previous pervasive 
discrimination."ws Whatever one thinks about the merits of penalizing 
indefinitely minorities who suffer the disadvantages of "previous 
pervasive discrimination," it is perfectly clear that the goal of inclusion, 
the chord of opportunity and access, was sounded in the Regents' brief 
in Bakke. "The country is well-served by programs like the one at the 
Davis medical school. They are positive proof to those so long 
excluded from positions of responsibility that all citizens are truly to be 
offered a chance to perform in professional roles."106 The brief speaks 
of "increasing aspirations among minorities that have viewed medicine 
as a field closed to them and thus unworthy of pursuit."101 And we are 
told: "[I]n the real world the mere elimination of formal barriers 
against minorities could not actually produce equality of 
opportunity."108 
As to the fit between the goal of inclusion and the means of race­
conscious admissions, Paul Mishkin from Boalt Hall and Archibald 
104. Brief for Petitioner at 13, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 
(1978) (No. 76-81 1 ). 
105.  Id 
106. Id at 1 6-17. 
107. Id at 32-33. 
108. Id at 35.  
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Cox, whose voice I first heard in my law school classes at Harvard, 
advised the Court: "It is almost certainly impossible to admit more 
than an isolated few minorities by resort to any referent truly neutral as 
to race."'09 But none of this is a part of Justice Powell's Bakke balance. 
Thus, if I am to fulfill the scholar's role as Justice Powell admired 
it, if I am to contribute an insight that builds understanding of the 
Supreme Court, its judicial personalities, its judicial methods, let me 
say that I find my insight in the chord of inclusion that Justice 
O'Connor adds to the Court's newly voiced Grutterbalance. 
A. Justice O'Connors Grutter Balance 
Justice O'Connor's analysis in Grutter observes that "only one of 
the interests asserted by the university survived Justice Powell's 
scrutiny."1 10 We are told: "Justice Powell approved the university's use 
of race to further only one interest: 'the attainment of a diverse student 
body."'1 1 1  But the weight of diversity as an end in Justice Powell 's 
Bakke balance is linked to the First Amendment, to academic freedom, 
and to obtaining "the educational benefits that flow from a diverse 
student body."112 This is only one way that Justice O 'Connor, quoting 
from Respondent Lee Bollinger's brief, describes the interest in 
diversity in her opinion in Gruffer. Justice 0' Connor, speaking for the 
Court and following Justice Powell's Bakke balance, writes: "The Law 
School's educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its 
educational mission is one to which we defer. The Law School's 
assessment that diversity will, in fact, yield educational benefits is 
substantiated by respondents and their amici"' ' 3  And more: "Our 
conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse 
student body is informed by our view that attaining a diverse student 
body is at the heart of the Law School's proper institutional mission."114 
The end of a diverse student body, according to Bakke's balance, 
is improved learning in our law schools. 1 1 5  But educational benefits 
may not be the only interest served by our nation's law schools. Might 
there not be room, on balance, for the weight of inclusion? 
109. Id at 39. 
1 10. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003). 
1 1 1 . Id 
1 12. Id at 365 (internal quotations omitted). 
1 13. Id at 332. 
1 14. Id at 333. 
1 1 5. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 3 1 2-13 (1978). 
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Learning is certainly at the heart of a law school's institutional 
mission, as I understand what I do day by day. For what it is worth, 
like the Court in Grutter, I believe the educational benefits recited in 
Justice O'Connor's opinion "are not theoretical but real"1 16 :  "cross­
racial understanding," "break[ing] down racial stereotypes," 
"enab[ling] [students] to better understand persons of different races," 
"livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting" 
classroom discussion. 1 1 1  The Law School's amici, the expert reports 
entered into evidence at trial, and numerous studies "show that student 
body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and 'better prepares 
students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better 
prepares them as professionals. '''1 18 
There are those who doubt these educational benefits, or make 
fun of them, as do Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence 
Thomas. More of this later under the heading Judicial Lions. As I 
said, I do not doubt these educational benefits, and I have done my 
duty by reading the amicus brief of the American Educational 
Research Association, William Bowen and Derek Bok 's book, The 
Shape of the River: Long-Tenn Consequences of Cons1dedng Race in 
College and um·versity Admissions, Gary Orfield and Michal 
Kurlaender's Diversity Challenged· The Evidence on the Impact of 
Affinnative Action, and a compendium entitled Compelling Interest: 
Examining the EVJdence on Racial Dynam.Jcs in Colleges and 
Um'versities-all of which are cited by Justice O'Connor in her 
opinion for the Court in Grutter. 1 19  I invite the reader to climb the 
Mount Everest of amici briefs on both sides (I count 1 60) and to 
ponder the sociological and psychological data hurled at the Court's 
feet in Gratz and Grotter- to say nothing of the views of General 
Motors or of General H. Norman Schwartzkopf 
But the weight of educational benefits flowing from a diverse 
student body that Justice Powell approved in Bakke is quite different 
1 1 6. Grotter, 539 U.S. at 333-34. 
1 1 7. Id at 333. 
1 1 8.  Id 
1 1 9. Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Educ. Research Ass'n et al. at 3, Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-24 1); WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE 
RlvER: LoNG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY 
ADMISSIONS ( 1 998); COMPELLING INTEREST: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE ON RACIAL 
DYNAMICS IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (Mitchell J. Chang, Daria Witt, James Jones & 
Kenji Makuta et al. eds., 2003); DIVERSITY CHALLENGED, supra note 17 .  
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from the weight of inclusion and opportunity stressed by the Regents 
and nowhere addressed by Justice Powell in his opinion in Bakke. 
B. The Chord of Inclusion 
Racial and ethnic diversity that serves access, opportunity, and 
inclusion as distinct ends in themselves-is the chord of inclusion 
quietly voiced by Justice O'Connor in Grutter.120 This weight of 
inclusion, as I hear it, is new. The amicus curiae brief of the American 
Bar Association, which is not mentioned in Justice O'Connor's opinion 
for the Court, is especially compelling in sounding the same goal. 
It is from the military that Justice O'Connor derives the Court's 
chord of inclusion. And here she uses the vital tool of analogy in the 
judicial method of the Court to voice the weight of inclusion in 
Gruffer. Thus, from the amicus curiae brief of a weighty list of our 
nation's military leaders, generals and civilians alike, "based on [their] 
decades of experience," Justice O'Connor recites the conclusion that a 
"highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the 
military's ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national 
security."121 This is the role-model weight of diversity. True, Wygant v. 
Jackson Board ofEducation122 rejects it. But Wygantinvolved layoffs, 
a difference a sensitive judicial eyepiece might see. Comes the 
analogy: "We agree that 'it requires only a small step from this 
analysis to conclude that our country's other most selective institutions 
must remain both diverse and selective.'"123 But the military's need for 
a "racially diverse officers corps in a racially diverse setting"124 is 
nowhere linked to Bakke's diversity balance, that is, to improving 
educational benefits. 
Next, Justice O'Connor's Grutter balance, building upon the 
military analogy, addresses the context of higher education.125 And 
here, as everywhere else in the law, context makes a difference. This 
was Professor Felix Frankfurter's lifetime teaching of the judicial 
process as a Justice of the Court. Before him, Justice Brandeis, 
120. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333.  
12 1 .  Id at 334 (internal quotations omitted) (alterations in original) (quoting Brief of 
Amici Curiae Julius W Becton Jr. et al. at 27, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 
02-241)). 
122. 476 U.S. 267 (1 986). 
123. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334. 
1 24. Id 
125. Id 
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borrowing from the regulae iuris of Rome,1'" professed his faith in 
facts: "Ex facto jus oritur. That ancient rule must prevail in order that 
we may have a system of living law."121 I try to teach the same lesson 
in class. 
Justice O'Connor in Grutterquotes from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's 
opinion in Gomillion v. Lightfoot-the telescopic view of how to read 
the Great Guarantees of the Constitution: "Context matters when 
reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection 
Clause."128 "The Constitution," said Justice Frankfurter, "commands 
neither logical symmetry nor exhaustion of a principle."129 Justice 
O'Connor herself is forced to back away from broad language in her 
opinion for the Court in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. that 
suggests remedying past discrimination is the only permissible 
justification for race-based governmental action. 130 But there is 
nothing new in the Court cabining its holdings to the controlling 
variant facts, as Professor Frankfurter taught so well at Harvard Law 
School. For her part in the judicial process of Gratz and Grutter, 
Justice O'Connor admonishes that, both as to means and as to ends, 
application of the formula of strict scrutiny must always remain 
responsive to the context in question. 131 Thus, "strict scrutiny is 
designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the 
importance and the sincerity of the government's reasons for using 
race in a particular context."132 Justice O'Connor's reference to 
sincerity in this sentence is also a subtle nuance of judgment evident to 
my eye. 
And what of the value of inclusion in higher education? This, as 
I hear it, is a new chord in Justice O'Connor's Grutter balance. Hear 
her voice for yourself "(O]pportunity through public institutions of 
higher education must be accessible to all individuals regardless of 
1 26. For a refined excursion through the classical jurists' ideas of regu/ae iuris, see 
PETER STEIN, REGULAE JURIS: FR.OM JURISTIC RULES 1D LEGAL MAxlMS ( l 966). 
1 27. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 600 ( 1 9 1 7) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), ovenv/ed in 
partby Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S 726 ( 1 963). 
1 28. Gruffer, 539 U.S. at 331 (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.  339, 343-44 
(1960) (admonishing that, "in dealing with claims under broad provisions of the Constitution, 
which derive content by an interpretive process of inclusion and exclusion, it is imperative 
that generalizations, based on and qualified by the concrete situations that gave rise to them, 
must not be applied out of context in disregard of variant controlling facts")). 
129. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 468 ( 1 950) (Frankfurter, J.). 
130. 488 U.S. 469 (1 989). 
1 3 1 .  Gruffer, 539 U.S. at 33 1 -32. 
1 32. Id 
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race or ethnicity."133 She quotes from the amicus curiae brief of the 
United States-never mind our Government opposed the Blue and 
Gold in Gratz and Michigan Law School in GrutteF-affirming that 
"[e]nsuring that public institutions are open and available to all 
segments of American society, including people of all races and 
ethnicities, represents a paramount government objective."'134 And 
more: "Nowhere is the importance of such openness more acute than 
in the context of higher education."135 I am reminded of Justice 
Powell's quoting Archibald Cox's book against Cox's argument in the 
Bakke case.136 It is at this point that Justice O'Connor, for herself, for 
the Court, and, hopefully, for the Nation, echoes the voice of a 
preacher, the voice of Dr. Martin Luther King at the Lincoln 
Memorial: "Effective participation by members of all racial and ethnic 
groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one 
Nation, indivisible, is to be realized."131 There are times in the life of 
our Constitution when the Court must voice hope and find the 
mediating way. This, as I hear it, is the voice of Gratz and Grutter. 
Ironically, I hear the same chord of inclusion in the voice of the 
first Justice John Marshall Harlan in his immortal dissent in Plessy v. 
Ferguson in 1896.1 38 It, too, rings down from the past, from a time 
when the justices sat in the Old Senate Chamber of the Capitol: 139 
''The destinies of the two races, in this country, are indissolubly linked 
together, and the interest of both require that the common government 
of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the 
sanction of law."140 Race hate, to my mind, is different from inclusion, 
from access. I like Justice John Paul Stevens 's figure, the difference 
between a "No Trespassing" sign and a "Welcome" mat. 141 I have 
133. Id at 334. 
134. Id (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae at 13, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S 306 (2003) (No. 02-241 )) . 
135. Id 
136. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 ( 1978). 
137. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334. 
138 .  163 U.S. 537, 552 ( 1 896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
1 39. "The old courtroom in the Capitol, which had been the Senate chamber of 
Benton, Henry Clay, and Webster, combined dignity with truly republican simplicity. I felt 
about it the way, years later, a security officer of mine felt when I pointed out to him the spot 
not far from the Place Royale in Paris on which Henry of Navarre was murdered. 'Gee, Mr. 
Secretary,' he said, 'there's a hell of a lot of history around here!" ACHESON, supra note 32, at 
56-57. 
140. Plessy, 1 63 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
141 .  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 5 1 5  U.S. 200, 243, 245 (1995) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted): 
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wondered, too, what the first John Marshall Harlan would say of Gratz 
and Grutter. Might he not see a difference of context? At any rate, his 
categorical conclusion that the Constitution is colorblind yielded to 
competing considerations in the old Cumming v. lb"chmond County 
Board of Education case, which also involved a question of 
educational policy, and yielded Justice Harlans' own mediating 
application of the Equal Protection Clause. 142 
There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is designed to 
perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination. 
Invidious discrimination is an engine o f  oppression, subjugating a disfavored group 
to enhance or maintain the power of the majority. Remedial race-based preferences 
reflect the opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality in society. No sensible 
conception of the Government's constitutional obligation to "govern impartially," 
should ignore this distinction. 
The consistency that the Court espouses would disregard the difference 
between a "No Trespassing" sign and a welcome mat. It would treat a Dixiecrat 
Senator's decision to vote against Thurgood Marshall 's confirmation in order to 
keep African-Americans off the Supreme Court as on a par with President 
Johnson's evaluation of his nominee's race as a positive factor. It would equate a 
law that made black citizens ineligible for military service with a program aimed at 
recruiting black soldiers. An attempt by the majority to exclude members of a 
minority race from a regulated market is fundamentally different from a subsidy 
that enables a relatively small group of newcomers to enter that market. An 
interest in "consistency" does not justify treating differences as though they were 
similarities. 
142. 1 75 U.S. 528, 544 (1 899): 
The plaintiffs in error complain that the Board of Education used the funds 
in its hands to assist in maintaining a high school for white children without 
providing a similar school for colored children. The substantial relief asked is an 
injunction that would either impair the efficiency of the high school provided for 
white children or compel the Board to close it. But if that were done, the result 
would only be to take from white children educational privileges enjoyed by them, 
without giving to colored children additional opportunities for the education 
furnished in high schools. The colored school children of the county would not be 
advanced in the matter of their education by a decree compelling the defendant 
Board to cease giving support to a high school for white children. The Board had 
before it the question whether it should maintain, under its control, a high school 
for about sixty colored children or withhold the benefits of education in primary 
schools from three hundred children of the same race. It was impossible, the 
Board believed, to give educational facilities to the three hundred colored children 
who were unprovided for, if it maintained a separate school for the sixty children 
who wished to have a high school education. Its decision was in the interest of the 
greater number of colored children, leaving the smaller number to obtain a high 
school education in existing private institutions at an expense not beyond that 
incurred in the high school discontinued by the Board. 
Of Harlan's Cumming decision, biographer Linda Przybyszewski is justly critical: 
"Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education in 1 899 is a short, stiff decision for the 
majority in which [Justice Harlan] refused to grant an injunction to make the school board 
2004) THE VOICE OF JUSTICE POWELL 1 983 
In the context of our Nation's law schools, Justice O'Connor 
emphasizes their role as "the training ground for a large number of the 
Nation's leaders."143 "Individuals with law degrees occupy roughly half 
of the state governorships, more than half the seats in the United States 
Senate, and more than a third of the seats in the United States House of 
Representatives."144 (And every seat on the Supreme Court of the 
United States.) Her next paragraph stands out. It speaks starkly of 
minority access, of inclusion, of diversity in the service of opportunity: 
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the 
citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to 
talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. All 
members of our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the 
openness and integrity of the educational institutions that provide this 
training . . . .  Access to legal education (and thus the legal profession) 
must be inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of every race and 
ethnicity, so that all members of our heterogeneous society may 
participate in the educational institutions that provide the training and 
education necessary to succeed in America.145 
In all likelihood, other justices of the Court influenced Justice 
O'Connor's opinion. Fashioning the Opinion of the Court is a joint 
enterprise. Justice Stevens, who joined Justice O'Connor's opinion in 
Grutter, said nothing for himself. Whether he was silent at Conference 
or among Chambers, I do not know. 146 But given his telling metaphor 
close its white public high school until it reopened the black one." LINDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI, 
THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN 99 (1 999). Mr. Justice Harlan 
himself wanted to be remembered for his immortal civil rights dissents, e.g., The Civil Rights 
Cases, Plessy v. Ferguson. He left instructions as to publishing his opinions and dissents for a 
memorial service held at the Metropolitan African Methodist-Episcopal Church in 
Washington, D. C. "But Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education is missing. 
Even an Anglo-Saxon may come to recognize his failures." Id at 1 1 7. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, let it be noted, thought that "Harlan I;' as he referred to the first 
Justice Harlan, had earned a bogus reputation as an opponent of segregation in public 
schools. "Frankfurter believed that on the contrary, faced with the issue of segregation in 
public schools, Harlan I would have sustained it." LIVA BAKER, FELIX FRANKFURTER 3 1 2  
(1 969). 
143 . Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003). 
144. Id 
145. Id at 335. 
146. From Justice Stevens himself we now have an unprecedented reprise of his silent, 
beneath-the-surface, Conference Room contribution to Grutter v. Bollinger, as reported by 
Charles Lane, Stevens Gives Rare Glimpse of High Court's 'Conference, 'WASH. POST, Oct. 
19, 2003, at A- 1 .  Justice Stevens, Senior Associate Justice at 84, casually cracked the secrecy 
of the Conference Room in a September 18, 2004 speech to the Chicago Bar Association in 
his honor. "I thought it might be of interest to you if I repeated some of the things I said to 
my colleagues." Id (internal quotations omitted). Of interest, indeed. Justice Stevens did 
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of the welcome mat, I suspect Justice Stevens welcomed the chord of 
inclusion carefully worked into the Court's opinion.147 
As I hear her, Justice O 'Connor voices a new compelling interest 
in Grutter. She weighs a new balance-a balance, if I am correct, 
beyond Justice Powell's in Bakke. Her contribution is vital. Once 
inclusion is worked into the formula, the Law School 's modest 
admission of minorities is a necessary means to a legitimate end, just 
as the Regents argued in Bakke. For the Court, like Justice Powell 
before her, Justice 0' Connor takes the mediating way between 
America's past and America's future. 
Bakke's balance, scaled anew in Grutter, thus extends into the 
future. The Court's twenty-five year time limit gives me no 
difficulty. 148 This is the common law tradition of our Constitution. I 
not repeat anything his colleagues said. Because his former law clerk Jeffery Lehman was 
the former Dean of Michigan Law School, Justice Stevens worried that this might create the 
appearance that he was biased in favor of the University. He raised the matter at Conference 
before the April I ,  2003 oral argument in Grutter. The other eight Justices "unanimously and 
very firmly" urged him to stay in the case because the Justices could not sit out each time one 
of their former clerks was involved. 
Justice Stevens, reading from his April 2, 2003, Grutter Conference notes, delivered a 
lengthy defense of the Law School's admissions program. "If we impose our will on the 
nation, there will really be a sea change in societal behavior that will not easily be reversed." 
Id (internal quotations omitted). "In the final analysis, I thought the real question was, 'Who 
should decide?' The nine of us sitting in the chambers of the Supreme Court or the 
accumulated wisdom of the country's leaders?" Id (internal quotations omitted). The amicus 
brief submitted by former military leaders, including retired General H. Norman 
Schwartzkopf and General Wesley Clark, was "very powerful" in arguing that a diverse 
military needs affirmative action at service academies and universities as a well-spring of 
minority officers. 
Justice John Paul Stevens urged the Conference to treat Justice Powell's lone opinion in 
Bakke as controlling authority in Grutter because major institutions had relied on it since 
1978. At Conference: "[W]e were all concerned about the length, the duration a preference 
program might take." Id (internal quotations omitted). But any concern blacks would 
become permanently dependent on preferences would "work itself out." "Presumably it is in 
the universities' self-interest to eliminate the preference as soon as it is no longer necessary 
. . .  There is no reason for the majority to grant preferences to the minority unless those 
preferences serve the best interests of the majority." Id (internal quotations omitted). 
This extraordinary contemporaneous oral "history," so to speak, shows that Justice 
Stevens voiced his separate views in Grutter v. Bollingerat Conference, if not in the Reports. 
Like Mr. Justice Frankfurter before him, Justice John Paul Stevens considers it a matter of 
judicial conscience and a point of honor to voice whatever angle of vision his eye sees in the 
facts of record and in the law of the case. He said precisely this, to my student Carolyn Pratt 
Perry, who wrote a seminar paper on Justice Stevens and who visited him in Chambers on our 
annual Greyhound field trip to the Court, circa 1978. 
147. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 5 1 5  U.S. 200, 245 ( 1 995) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
1 48. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342. 
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hear an echo of the Court's fonnula in Brown v. Board of Education­
"all deliberate speed."149 And as I see it, Justice O'Connor's method in 
Gratz and Grutter lies at the heart of the Court's judicial process, in 
constitutional law and elsewhere. 
In hard cases, there are no absolutes. 1 50 The Court does better to 
mediate between black and white. Holmes said it best in this flash of 
insight from Hudson "1lter Co. v. McCarter. 
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical 
extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of 
policy which are other than those on which the particular right is 
founded, and which become strong enough to hold their own when a 
certain point is reached.151 
A sense of neighborhood, a sense of love of our fellow man, a 
sense of shared destiny, not race hate, is my sense of Grutters 
balance.152 
V. 0rHER VOICES 
A. David H Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer 
The judicial workways of Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer in Gratz and Gmtter merit a few 
comments from my point of view of process and personality. 
I have read David H. Souter's revealing essay, Mr. Justice 
Duncan, tucked away in the New Hampshire Bar JoumaJ.153 It 
illuminates Justice Souter's way, as he tells us of his predecessor on the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court, Laurence Ilsley Duncan-"a 
149. Brown v. Bd. ofEduc. [BroMJ ilj, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
150. According to the illwninating compendiwn of Felix Frankfurter's extrajudicial 
essays on the Court and the Constitution, Frankfurter observed: 
"But when, in any field of human observation, two truths appear in conflict it is 
wiser to assume that neither is exclusive, and that their contradiction, though it may 
be hard to bear, is part of the mystery of things." But judges cannot leave such 
contradiction between two conflicting "truths" as "part of the mystery of things." 
They have to adjudicate. If the conflict cannot be resolved, the task of the Court is 
to arrive at an accommodation of the contending claims. This is the core of the 
difficulties and misunderstandings about the judicial process. This, for any 
conscientious judge, is the agony of his duty. 
FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT 508 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1 970) (quoting 
Literature and Dogma, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT (London), Jan. 22, 1954, at 5 1  ). 
1 5 1 .  209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908). 
1 52. In short, times have changed. Jn the words of ABA President Dennis W Archer, 
"[t]oday is a new beginning." President's Message, AB.A. J., Sept. 2003, at 8. 
153. David Souter, Mr. Justice Duncan, N.H. BARJ., Oct. 1 983, at 8 1 .  
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consummate master craftsman o f  the law."154 "He believed the world 
had a fair claim to the highest use of his power to bring order to human 
thought, for the sake of liberty and the common good."155 Duncan was 
"a technician who believed the record was king."156 So does Justice 
Souter, who tells us in his Gratz dissent that, "[a]lthough the freslunan 
admissions system here is subject to argument on the merits, I think it 
is closer to what Grutter approves than to what Bakke condemns, and 
should not be held unconstitutional on the current record."157 Says 
Souter, "[ s ]ince the record is quiet, if not silent, on the case-by-case 
work of the [Admissions Review] committee, the Court would be on 
more defensible ground by vacating and remanding for evidence about 
the committee's specific determinations."158 Like Duncan, Justice 
Souter bores into soft spots: "The point system cannot operate as a de 
facto set-aside if the greater admissions process, including review by 
the committee, results in individualized review sufficient to meet the 
Court's standards."159 
There was more to Duncan, however, than technical powers, "or 
they would not have been the technical powers of a great judge."160 
What is Souter's measure of a great judge? 
He was a great judge because he saw beyond records and articulated 
premises, to litigants and to the sources of a court's strength to do right 
by litigants, whatever the right might be. He took the long view, even 
when the litigants were not the most sympathetic and even when a 
majority in his own court were, in his judgment, wrong.161 
There is a measure of the long view, as I see it, in Justice Souter's 
Gratz_ di�sen:. For him, �d for Jus�ice Ginsburg, the constitutionality 
of Michigan s twenty-pomt system is a matter of degree falling on the 
right side of Bakke's balance: 
Th� ve� na�e of a college's permissible practice of awarding value 
�o racial d1vers1ty m�ans that race must be considered in a way that 
mcr�as�s �ome applicants' chances for admission. Since college 
admis�10� IS not left entirely to inarticulate intuition, it is hard to see 
what IS mappropriate in assigning some stated value to a relevant 
154 .  Id 
1 5 5 .  Id at 87 .  
1 56 .  
157 .  
1 58 .  
1 59 .  
160 .  
1 6 1 .  
Id at 83-84. 
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 296 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
Id at 298 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
Id (Souter, J., dissenting). 
Souter, supra note 1 53 , at 85. 
Id 
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characteristic, whether it be reasoning ability, writing style, running 
speed, or minority race. Justice Powell's plus factors necessarily are 
assigned some values. The college simply does by a numbered scale 
what the law school accomplishes in its "holistic review"; the 
distinction does not imply that applicants to the undergraduate college 
are denied individualized consideration or a fair chance to compete on 
the basis of all the various merits their applications may disclose.162 
All judgment is a matter of degree. "It suffices for me," said 
David Souter, "that there are no Bakke-like set-asides and that 
consideration of an applicant's whole spectrum of ability is no more 
ruled out by giving 20 points for race than by giving the same points 
for athletic ability or socioeconomic disadvantage."163 This is Justice 
Souter's nuanced judgment. His is also a voice of judicial balance. 
Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Gratz, in the style of Louis 
Brandeis's mastery of the telescope, focuses on the larger landscape of 
law and fact, and their interplay. She objects to the Majority's 
insistence that "the same standard of review controls judicial 
inspection of all official race classifications."164 She objects to 
Adarands plea for "consistency" in the application of strict scrutiny 
across all terrains of governmental action.165 "[W]e are not far distant 
from an overtly discriminatory past, and the effects of centuries of law­
sanctioned inequality remain painfully evident in our communities and 
schools."166 "Unemployment, poverty, and access to health care vary 
disproportionately by race. Neighborhoods and schools remain 
racially divided. African-American and Hispanic children are all too 
often educated in poverty stricken and underperforming institutions."161 
Justice Ginsburg's footnotes painstakingly document her opinion, in 
the style of Justice Brandeis's "Mount Everest of footnotes."168 The 
1 62 .  Gratz, 539 U.S. at 297 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
163. Id at 298 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
164. Id at 300 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
1 65.  Id (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 5 1 5  U.S. 
200, 224 ( 1995)). 
1 66. Id at 299 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
1 67 .  Id at 300 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). 
1 68 .  Dean Acheson, Jaw clerk to Mr. Justice Brandeis during the October 1 9 1 9
 �? 
1920 Tenns, later Secretary of State under President Truman, mused as to Brandeis s 
footnotes: 
He wrote the opinion; I wrote the footnotes. 
My footnotes up to that time were the Mount Eve�est of footn?tes. Tod
a:y. 
Justices of the Supreme Court write textbooks as marginal annotations of
 theII 
opinion, but up to that time I had written the greatest footnotes, fifteen
 pages of 
footnotes. 
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way of the scholar is her way. She makes good use of scholarship in 
the law reviews. Quoting Professor Carter in the "Yale Law Journal, 
she reports that "[t]o say that two centuries of struggle for the most 
basic of civil rights have been mostly about freedom from racial 
categorization rather than freedom from racial oppression is to 
trivialize the lives and deaths of those who have suffered under 
racism."169 She also notes Professor Carter's point that "[t]o pretend . . .  
that the issue presented in [Bakke] was the same as the issue in 
[ BrolWl] is to pretend that history never happened and that the present 
doesn't exist."110 Says Justice Ginsberg, "[t]he stain of generations of 
racial oppression is still visible in our society and the determination to 
hasten its removal remains vital."111 
As to the University's admitted allocation of twenty points in 
Gra.tz, Justice Ginsburg insists on honesty, as Justice Brandeis insisted 
on honesty: "If honesty is the best policy, surely Michigan's accurately 
described, fully disclosed College affirmative action program is 
preferable to achieving similar numbers through winks, nods, and 
disguises."112 Justice Souter's dissent in Gratz says the same thing: 
"Michigan states its purpose directly and, if this were a doubtful case 
And what were we trying to do? We were collecting all the legislation and 
all the decisions of the forty-eight states and the Territories of the United States as 
to what was an intoxicating beverage. The purpose of this, of course, was to show 
that when Congress said "one half of one per cent of alcohol by volwne is 
intoxicating;' that that was reasonable, because all the states had said everything in 
the world beside that. And compared to the confusion of the states, this was 
Reason Incarnate. So I went to work on the opinion. 
Dean Acheson, Recollections of Service with the Federal Supreme Court, 1 8  ALA. LAW. 355, 
364-65 (1957), quoted in Paul R. Baier, The Law Clerks: Profile of an Institution, 26 VAND. 
L. REv. 1 125, 1 1 5 1  ( 1973). "The idea of footnotes was the Justice's, but the compilation of 
them was mine. They established a world's record in footnotes to that time and constituted 57 
per centum of the opinion by volume. They were a noble work, worthy of a better cause." 
ACHESON, supra note 32, at 79. 
Louis D. Brandeis himself, upon graduation with the highest average ever from Harvard 
Law School, clerked for Mr. Justice Horace Gray, of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court, later Mr. Justice Gray of the Supreme Court of the United States. For more on the 
history and growth of the law clerk institution and the sundry duties of what Learned Hand 
called "puisne judges," see generally ON LAW CLERKING: A COMPREHENSNE VIEW (Paul R. 
Baier ed., 1974). 
1 69. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 301  (2003) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (internal 
quotations omitted) (quoting Stephen L. Carter, "'7Jen Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE 
L.J. 420, 433-34 ( 1 988)). 
170. Id (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Carter, supra 
note 169, at 434). 
1 7 1 .  Id at 303 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
1 72. Id (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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for me, I would be tempted to give Michigan an extra point of its own 
for its frankness. Equal protection cannot become an exercise in 
which the winners are the ones who hide the ball."173 I see Justice 
Holmes's touch in Justice Souter's writing. 
Regarding the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Ginsburg in Gratz, 
joined by Justice Souter and Justice Breyer, sees in the Equal 
Protection Clause a balance quite different from Justice Powell's in 
Bakke.114 
In implementing this equality instruction, as I see it, government 
decisionmakers may properly distinguish between policies of exclusion 
and inclusion. Actions designed to burden groups long denied full 
citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked with measures taken to 
hasten the day when entrenched discrimination and its after effects have 
been extirpated. 175 
Justice Breyer's contribution to the symposium of Gratz and 
Grutteris a single sentence in a single paragraph-brevity unusual, but 
welcome, from my former professor of law-his opinion concurring in 
the judgment of the Court in Gratz.116 "[ G ]overnment decisionmakers 
may properly distinguish between policies of inclusion and exclusion," 
says Justice Breyer succinctly, "for the former are more likely to prove 
consistent with the basic constitutional obligation that the law respect 
each individual equally."111 
B. Judicial Lions 
The first Justice Harlan's categorical imperative, "Our 
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes 
among citizens,"118 is assuredly the voice of Justice Antonin Scalia, the 
first Italian-American on the Court. I have walked the streets of Siena, 
Italy, with Justice Scalia (courtesy of Tulane University School of 
Law). Antonin Scalia is a rousing personality, · whom I like and 
respect. As a judge, I would cast him as a street fighter. The "Security 
of the Absolute" also shapes the judicial temper of Justice Clarence 
Thomas, the second African-American on the Supreme Court. Thus, 
Thomas asserts, "I would hold that a State's use of racial 
1 73. Id at 299 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
1 74. Id at 30 l (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
17 5. Id (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
1 76. Id at 288-89 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
1 77. Id at 289 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
178. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 ( 1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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discrimination in higher education admissions is categorically 
prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause."119 The judicial personality 
of our friend Justice Categorical haunts the Supreme Court in Grutter 
like Hamlet's Ghost. I have heard Justice Thomas 's deep, resonant 
voice at LSU. It clashes vociferously with that of his predecessor of 
color, Justice Thurgood Marshall. They view the Fourteenth 
Amendment's text and context from different angles.180 They weigh the 
competing interests at stake on diverse scales of justice.18 1  Like the 
first John Marshall Harlan, the current judicial personalities of Justice 
Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas roar like lions in Gratz 
1 79. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 288 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
1 80. "Since the Congress that considered and rejected the objections to the 1 866 
Freedman's Bureau Act concerning special relief to Negroes also proposed the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it is inconceivable that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prohibit all 
race-conscious relief measures." Regents o f  the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 398 
(1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part). Inconceivable? Not to Justice Clarence Thomas. 
University of Virginia Law School Professor J. Harvie Wilkinson III (later Chief Judge 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit) catches the tensions of 
affirmative action as they collide in the text and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment: 
"History teaches, we have noted, the prodigious dangers of encouraging racial patterns of 
thought. Yet it asks us something else besides: whether a constitution, after generations of 
endorsing color-consciousness, can abruptly demand that the world be color-blind." 
WILKINSON, supra note 1 5, at 294. 
For a poignant comparison of the judicial personalities of Justice Thurgood Marshall 
and Justice Clarence Thomas from an interested academic, see Jolm 0. Calmore, Ai.ring Dirty 
Laundry: Disputes Among PriVJJeged Blacks-From Clarence Thomas to "The Law School 
Five, "46 How. L.J. 175  (2003). 
1 8 1 .  "[I]t must be remembered that, during most of the past 200 years, the 
Constitution as interpreted by this Court did not prohibit the most ingenious and pervasive 
forms of discrimination against the Negro. Now, when a State acts to remedy the effects of 
that legacy of discrimination, I cannot believe that this same Constitution stands as a barrier." 
Bakke, 438 U.S .  at 387 (Marshall, J., concurring in part). Whatever one thinks of the 
theoretical divide between Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice Clarence Thomas, it is the 
fact that Justice Marshall 's judicial personality lingers still at Conference, which is precisely 
the point of this Essay. "[T]he man who would, as a lawyer and jurist, captivate the nation 
would also, as colleague and friend, profoundly influence me." Sandra Day O'Connor, 
Thurgood Marshall" The Influence ofa Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 2 1 7 ,  1 2 1 7  ( 1 992). 
"Justice Marshall imparted not only his legal acumen but also his life experiences, constantly 
pushing and prodding us to respond not only to the persuasiveness of legal argument but also 
to the power of moral truth." id Thurgood Marshall reminded us "that the law is not an 
abstract concept removed from the society it serves, and that judges, as safeguarders of the 
Constitution, must constantly strive to narrow the gap between the ideal of equal justice and 
the reality of social inequality." Id at 1 2 1 8. "No one could help but be moved by Justice 
Thurgood Marshall's spirit; no one could avoid being touched by his soul." Id at 1 220. 
Justice O'Connor's new book, has an entire chapter on Justice Marshall, with an engaging 
snapshot of Justice Marshall in his Chambers at the Court, facing page 135. "S-a-a-a-n-d-r-a­
a-a," he called out once, "did I ever tell you about the welcome I received in Mississippi?" 
O'CONNOR, supra note 65, at I 36 (internal quotations omitted). 
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and Gmtter. I t  i s  a fact that Holmes called the first Justice Harlan, 
"My lionhearted friend." 
1 .  Justice Antonin Scalia 
Justice Scalia 's dissent in Grutter certainly roars. The Law 
School's "critical mass" idea "challenges even the most gullible mind. 
The admissions statistics show it to be a sham to cover a scheme of 
racially proportionate admissions."182 Michigan's only interest, 
according to Justices Scalia and Thomas, is the state's interest in 
maintaining a "prestige" law school whose high admissions standards 
disproportionately exclude blacks and other minority groups.183 If the 
supposed benefits of diversity are as compelling as the Law School 
claims, it should be forced to lower its admissions standards and give 
up its "super duper" status (as Scalia put it during oral argument).184 
Justice Scalia makes fun of the aims of the Law School. He ridicules 
the goal of "cross-racial understanding"-"This is not, of course, an 
'educational benefit' on which students will be graded on their Law 
School transcript (Works and Plays Well with Others: B+) or tested by 
the bar examiners (Q: Describe in 500 words or less your cross-racial 
understanding)."185 He sees trouble ahead: "[T]oday's Grutter-Gratz 
split double header seems perversely designed to prolong the 
controversy and the litigation."186 I like his figure of speech, "split 
double header."187 Justice Scalia anticipates future lawsuits.  "I do not 
look forward to any of these cases."188 His last categorical roar:-"The 
Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the basis of 
race, and state-provided education is no exception."189 
1 82. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
183. Id (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
1 84. Oral Argument at 3 1 ,  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241): 
MS. MAHONEY [Counsel for Respondents Bollinger, et al.]: Your Honor, I don't 
think there's anything in this Court's cases that suggests that the law school has to 
make an election between academic excellence and racial diversity. The interest 
here is having a-
QUESTION [JUSTICE SCALIA] : !f it claims it's a compelling State interest. If 
it's important enough to override the Constitution's prohibition of racial 
discrimination, it seems to me it's important enough to override Michigan's desire 
to have a super-duper law school. 
185.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
1 86. Id at 345 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
187. Id (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
188.  Id at 346 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
1 89. Id (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
1 992 TULANE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 78: 1955 
2. Justice Clarence Thomas 
Justice Thomas 's dissent in Grutter is also loud, self-assured, and 
single-minded. A note of sympathy is drowned out by an absolute. 
"Because I wish to see all students succeed whatever their color, I 
share, in some respect, the sympathies of those who sponsor the type 
of discrimination advanced by the University of Michigan Law 
School,"190 says Justice Thomas. 
But,-Comes the Absolute-: "The Constitution does not, 
however, tolerate institutional devotion to the status quo in admissions 
policies when such devotion ripens into racial discrimination. Nor 
does the Constitution countenance the unprecedented deference the 
Court gives to the Law School, an approach inconsistent with the very 
concept of 'strict scrutiny."'191 Justice Thomas is heated: "I believe 
that the Law School's current use of race violates the Equal Protection 
Clause and that the Constitution means the same thing today as it will 
in 300 months."192 Very heated: "The majority upholds the Law 
School's racial discrimination not by interpreting the people's 
Constitution, but by responding to a faddish slogan of the 
cognoscenti."193 He quotes his own opinion in Adarand "Purchased at 
the price of immeasurable human suffering, the equal protection 
principle reflects our Nation's understanding that such classifications 
ultimately have a destructive impact on the individual and our 
society."194 Mr. Justice Thomas roars louder and louder: "Diversity" is 
only "a fashionable catchphrase."195 Michigan Law S chool's real 
interest is only an "aesthetic"196-"That is, the Law School wants to 
have a certain appearance, from the shape of the desks and tables in its 
classrooms to the color of the students sitting at them."197 And louder: 
''A distinction between these two ideas (unique educational benefits 
based on racial aesthetics and race for its own sake) is purely 
sophistic-so much so that the majority uses them interchangeably."198 
Comes the loudest roar of all, jaws wide open:-"Finally, even if the 
1 90. Id at 346 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
191 . Id (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
192.  Id at 347 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
1 93 .  Id at 346 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
194. Id at 348 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 
5 1 5  US 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
195 .  Id at 349 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
196. Id at 349 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
197. Id (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
198. Id (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Law School's racial tinkering produces tangible educational benefits, a 
marginal improvement in legal education cannot justify racial 
discrimination where the Law School has no compelling interest in 
either its existence or in its current educational and admissions 
policies."199 In Grutter, may I say, Justice Thomas eats Michigan Law 
School for lunch. 
The mediating way, the way of judicial balance in Gratz and 
Grutter, is anathema to Justices Scalia and Thomas. "[T]he Law 
School should be forced to choose between its classroom aesthetic and 
its exclusionary admissions system-it cannot have it both ways."200 
There is none o f  the middle ground. There is none of Justice Powell's 
soft voice. There is none of Bakke's balance. Competing First 
Amendment interests, first soWlded by Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy 
v. New Hampshire, later voiced all alone by Justice Powell in Bakke, 
and f mally accepted by the Court in Grutter, are brushed aside angrily. 
Justice Thomas quotes Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy opinion against 
the Court itself: "In my view, 'it is the business' of this Court to 
explain itself when it cites provisions of the Constitution to invent new 
doctrines-including the idea that the First Amendment authorizes a 
public university to do what would otherwise violate the Equal 
Protection Clause."201 Entering Felix Frankfurter's mind, Clarence 
Thomas says, "I doubt that when Justice Frankfurter spoke of 
governmental intrusions into the independence of universities, he was 
thinking of the Constitution's ban on racial discrimination."202 
Justice Thomas answers GrutteJ's social science with social 
science of his own. Racial heterogeneity actually impairs learning 
among black students.203 The purported "beneficiaries" are 
underperforming in the classroom.204 "The majority of blacks are 
admitted to the Law School because of discrimination, and because of 
this policy all are tarred as undeserving."205 Stigma matters to Justice 
Thomas. "When blacks take positions in the highest places of 
government, industry, or academia, it is an open question today 
1 99. Id at 353 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
200. Id (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
201 .  Id at 354 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 
234, 263 (1957)). 
202. Id at 355 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
203. Id at 359-60 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
204. Id (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
205. Id at 361 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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whether their skin color played a part in their advancement. The 
question itself is the stigma . . . . "2u6 
Under the majority's "unprecedented deference to the Law 
School-a deference antithetical to strict scrutiny,"207 Justice Thomas 
fears serious collateral consequences. To wit, "[a]n HBC's [Historical 
Black College's] rejection of white applicants in order to maintain 
racial homogeneity seems permissible."208 According to Justice 
Thomas: "Contained within today's majority opinion is the seed of a 
new constitutional justification for a concept I thought long and rightly 
rejected-racial segregation."209 And what about United States v. 
Virginia,210 where, in stark contrast, "this Court gave no deference."2 1 1  
"Apparently where the status quo being defended is that of the elite 
establishment-here the Law School-rather than a less fashionable 
Southern military institution, the Court will defer without serious 
inquiry and without regard to the applicable legal standard."2 12 
"The sky has not fallen at Boalt Hall at the University of 
California, Berkeley,"211 says Justice Thomas. After California's 
adoption of Proposition 209, Boalt Hall, in 2002, "without deploying 
express racial discrimination in admissions,"214 enrolled fourteen blacks 
(down only seven from 1996) and thirty-six Hispanics (up eight from 
1996).215 (Justice Thomas says nothing, however, about the University 
of Texas Law School, after Hopwood, where the data are strikingly 
different.)2'6 Again a roar: 
206. Id (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
207. Id at 354 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
208. Id at 356 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
209. Id (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
2 1 0. 5 1 8  U.S. 5 1 5  ( 1996). 
2 1 1 .  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 356 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
2 12. Id (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
213.  Id at 357 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
2 14. Id (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
2 15 .  Id (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
216. The most recent (2003) data I have seen, painstakingly detailed in William C. 
Kidder, The Struggle for Access from Sweatt to Grutter: A History of African Amencan, 
Latino, and Amen'can Indian Law School School Admissions, 1950-2000, 1 9  HARV. 
BLACKLETIERL.J. l , 3 1  (2003), reveal 
a precipitous drop in African American enrollments after affirmative action was banned. 
Across the five schools, African Americans were 6.65% of enrollments with affnmative 
action, but 2.25% of enrollments without affirmative action. In effect, the clock was 
turned back on three decades of affirmative action in California. At Boalt Hall, African 
Americans were 2.7% of enrollments from 1997 to 200 1 .  By comparison, Blacks were 
9.00/o of enrollments in the first five years in which affirmative action took full effect 
(1968-1972). Likewise, African Americans were 7.5% of enrollments at UCLA in the 
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The Court will not even deign to make the Law School try other 
methods, however, preferring instead to grant a 25-year license to 
violate the Constitution. And the same Court that had the courage to 
order the desegregation of all public schools in the South now fears, on 
the basis of platitudes rather than principle, to force the Law School to 
abandon a decidedly imperfect admissions regime that provides the 
basis for racial discrimination.211 
Justice Thomas offers his own deconstruction: "I believe what 
lies beneath the Court's decision today are the benighted notions that 
one can tell when racial discrimination benefits (rather than hurts) 
minority groups, and that racial discrimination is necessary to remedy 
general societal ills."2 18 
Three more roars and my parsing of Thomas 's dissent in Grutter 
is ended. 
Roar the First:-"The Law School is not looking for those 
students who, despite a lower LSAT score or undergraduate grade 
point average, will succeed in the study of law. The Law School seeks 
only a fa�ade-it is sufficient that the class looks right, even if it does 
not perform right."2 19 
Roar The Second, aimed at the Majority's 25-year license to the 
Law School to violate the Constitution upon its "fabricated" 
compelling state interest:-"No one can seriously contend, and the 
Court does not, that the racial gap in academic credentials will 
disappear in 25 years. Nor is the Court's holding that racial 
discrimination will be unconstitutional in 25 years made contingent on 
the gap closing in that time."220 
Finally, Roar The Third, Justice Thomas 's closing lines in 
Grutter.-
first five years of affirmative action ( 1 967- 1 97 1 )  but only 2.3% of enrollments thirty 
years later (1997-200 1). The University of Texas came full circle as well, as a half­
centwy of hard-fought yet halting progress was erased. In 1951,  Heman Sweatt and the 
five other African American entrants to the first post-de jure segregation class at UT 
constituted 2.1 % of enrollments. African Americans were a nearly identical proportion 
of enrollments (2.2%) at UT in 1997-200 1 .  The extent to which Boalt, UCLA, and UT 
became resegregated is particularly disheartening in light of the recent history of those 
institutions. Boalt Hall and UCLA combined to award nearly 600 law degrees to 
African Americans between 1987 and 1 997, and UT produced some 650 Black attorneys 
prior to Hopwood 
Id (footnotes omitted). 
2 1 7. Grutter, 539 U. S. at 359 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
218. Id (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
21 9. Id at 360 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
220. Id at 363 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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For the immediate future, however, the majority has placed its 
imprimatur on a practice that can only weaken the principle of equality 
embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the Equal Protection 
Clause. "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor 
tolerates classes among citizens." It has been nearly 140 years since 
Frederick Douglass asked the intellectual ancestors of the Law School 
to "[d]o nothing with us !" and the Nation adopted the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Now we must wait another 25 years to see this principle 
of equality vindicated.221 
My reaction? I think immediately of what appears on the last 
page of the 24th of Howard, the voice o f  Mr. Justice Grier, the Latin 
from Cicero: "Haud eqwdem inv1deo, miror magis."222 ("It is not so 
much that I am angry, but rather that I marvel at it.") Or if I may 
avouch Hohnes as a witness: "The great ordinances of the 
Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white."223 
C The Court and Its Cntics 
Rather than answer Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas point by 
point, let me respond to a few of their louder roars, which it is beyond 
my academic nature to leave unanswered. (I have paraphrased Justice 
Scalia's dissent in Planned Parenthood ofSoutheastem Pennsylvania v. 
Casej24 only slightly.) 
My idea of a judicial personality includes a good mind. One 
critic of the Court has said that the Justices compose ''A Court of 
Mediocrity," that Justice Scalia 's brainpower is "head and shoulders 
above his colleagues,"225 and that Justices Kennedy and Souter are 
"intellectual ciphers"-the latter assertion by way of loud innuendo.226 
Whatever else I know, I am confident in saying that the Justices who 
accepted "diversity" as a compelling interest in Gruffer and who 
approved the Law School's "critical mass" explanation are not 
"gullible" minds. Ridicule and sarcasm have no place, I daresay, in the 
vital work of the Court. I do not like it. Justice Powell is my ideal of 
221 .  Id at 364 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1 896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
222. Gaines v. Hennen, 24 How. 553, 63 1 (1 860) (Grier, J., dissenting). 
223. Springer v. Gov't, 277 U.S. 1 89, 209 ( 1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
224. 505 U.S. 833, 981 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I must, however, respond to a 
few of the more outrageous arguments in today's opinion, which it is beyond hwnan nature to 
leave unanswered."). 
225. Bruce Fein, A Court of Mediocrity, A.B.A. J. , Oct. 1991 ,  at 74, 75. 
226. Id at 79. 
2004] THE VOICE OF JUSTICE PO WELL 1 997 
judicial personality, a Virginia gentleman.221 Justice O' Connor in her 
new book, The Majesty of the Law: Reflections of a Supreme Court 
Justice, gives us a sketch of her own: "Lewis was very hardworking 
and attended to every detail. He was concerned in every case about 
the equity at the bottom line-about reaching a fair and just result."228 
Justice Powell, of course, held firm to his understanding of the 
Constitution. "(U]ndemeath that gentlemanly exterior was a firmness 
and resolve. When he decided on a course of action, he would hold his 
ground."229 
But Justice Powell, as I know him, would not roar. He would not 
ridicule. The same is true of Justice 0' Connor. Her method in Gratz 
and in Grutter is Justice Powell's method. She, too, holds firmly to her 
ground: "Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling 
interest in a diverse student body is informed by our view that attaining 
a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School's proper 
institutional mission . . . .  "230 I sense a slightly louder tone of voice 
here, in response to the claim that the Law School's interest is only an 
"aesthetic"23 1-that the distinction between diversity's educational 
benefits and race for its own sake "is purely sophistic."232 To the 
contrary, the Court is convinced of the "sincerity of the reasons 
advanced by [the Law School] for the use of race in that particular 
context."233 Justice O'Connor, as I read her opinion in Grutter, is no 
Sophist Judge. 
Justice Thomas 's claim that "the equal protection principle 
reflects our Nation's understanding that such classifications ultimately 
have a destructive impact on the individual and our society"234 gives me 
pause. The Thirty-Ninth Congress, which adopted the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the race-based affirmative action programs of the 
Freedman's Bureau Act, "cannot have intended the amendment to 
227. And before Justice Powell, Justice Louis D. Brandeis: "He never gave way to bad 
temper because his views had not prevailed, nor dealt disrespectfully with the arguments of 
the majority, as too often occurs." ACHESON, supra note 32, at 94. 
228. O'CONNOR, supra note 65, at 1 50. 
229. Id Justice O'Connor adds: "Lewis Powell followed the precept of another famous 
Southerner, General Robert E. Lee: 'Do your duty in all things. You cannot do more. You 
should never do less."' Id 
230. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003). 
23 1 .  Id at 349 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
232. Id at 350 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
233. Id at 33 1 .  
234. Id at 348 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 
5 1 5  US 200, 240 ( 1 995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). 
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forbid the adoption of such remedies by itself or the states,"235 as Eric 
Schnapper has documented. "[T]he framers of the fourteenth 
amendment cannot have intended it to nullify remedial legislation of 
the sort Congress simultaneously adopted."236 Candidly, Texas Law 
School Professor Lino Graglia, an ardent foe of affirmative action, 
agrees: "I very much doubt that the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was meant to preclude state efforts to help 
blacks as blacks."231 Yale Law School Professor Jed Rubenfeld says the 
same thing, and tellingly: "In July 1 866, the Thirty-Ninth Congress­
the selfsame Congress that had just framed the Fourteenth 
Amendment-passed a statute appropriating money for certain poor 
women and children. Which ones? The act appropriated money for 
'the relief of destitute colored women and children."'238 What is 
Professor Rubenfeld's advice in the Yale Law Journal? "Justices 
Scalia and Thomas, whose commitment to original understandings and 
practices is also a matter of record-should drop their categorical 
opposition to race-based affirmative action measures."239 They have 
not. Nor have Justices Scalia and Thomas paid any attention to "our 
Nation's understanding" of equal protection voiced by the many 
elected Members of Congress who appeared as amici curiae in Gratz 
and Gmtter in support of such classifications-condemned by our 
Judicial Lions, Justices Scalia and Thomas, but which these same 
Representatives and United States Senators show are in the People's 
law up to this day. 240 
235. Eric Schnapper, Affinnative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 7 1  VA. L. REv. 753, 785 (1985). 
236. Id at 789. 
237. Lino A Graglia, "Affinnative Action, " Past, Present, and Future, 22 Omo N.U. L. 
REv. 1207, 1224-25 (1 996) (footnote omitted). 
238. Rubenfeld, supra note 20, at 430. 
239. Id at 427. 
240. Brief of Amici Curiae John Conyers, Jr. et al., at 27-28, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-24 1 )  (citations omitted): 
Congress has consistently rejected bills introduced to eliminate or prohibit race­
conscious decision making needed to promote access to government resources and 
benefits. With the benefit of this Court's decision in [ Adanma], Congress has 
reached a
_ 
considered decision to preserve race as one factor in providing access to 
th� benefits of federal programs and initiatives. For example, the 105th Congress 
rejected the "Riggs Amendment," which would have prohibited "discrimination 
and pr�fe��mtial treatmen� in connecti�n with admissions to institutions of higher 
education under the Higher Education Act of 1 965. Likewise in 1 997 a 
b!partisan majority of the House Judiciary Committee voted to table' H.R. 1 909, a 
bill 
_
spon�ored by Representative Canady that would have prohibited the 
cons1deration of race or gender in any federal program or initiative. Elected 
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Justice Frankfurter hired the first African-American law clerk.241 
If I may enter his mind, he probably thought that racial diversity and 
minority opportunity in his Chambers contributed to the public good 
and to the appearance of justice at the Court, not that he was violating 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
I do not see the seed of segregation that Justice Thomas sees in 
Grutter. Although whites at "Historically Black Colleges" are few in 
number, they are welcome. Their exclusion in order to maintain racial 
homogeneity, should it come to pass, presents a different case, or so 
the Court might see it. I am sure Justice Ginsburg sees Umted States v. 
Virginia differently. 
As far as tarring minority students with a badge of inferiority, this 
is a risk that both minority law students and the University of 
Michigan Law School are willing to take if the badges are to come 
down.242 And coming down they are, as I read Michigan's Law 
Quadrangle Notes and know my own LSU Law Center. As for the 
claim that the Michigan Law School is not looking for minority 
students who will succeed in the study of law, may I say this is not the 
representatives of both parties have joined together to preserve race-conscious 
decision making as a tool for fulfilling Congress' constitutional charge to eradicate 
the legacy of inequality that results from this nation's long history of racial 
discrimination by providing broad access to the programs, opportunities, and 
resources sponsored by the federal government. 
24 1 .  "On the Court, he had hired the first Negro law clerk, in 1948-49." BAKER, sup1'1 
note 142, at 3 10. Liva Baker writes: 
Id 
He never forgot a poignant conversation concerning that appointment which 
took place in his chambers. When his Negro messenger heard about the 
appointment, he said, "Mr. Justice, that was a mighty fine thing you did, hiring one 
of our people to be your clerk." 
Frankfurter chided him gently. "Tom," he said, "I have heard that kind of 
remark from others, but I am surprised to hear it from you. Don't you know that I 
selected William Coleman because, on the basis of character and ability, I felt he 
deserved the position?" 
"Mr. Justice," replied the messenger, "do you think in this world our people 
get what they deserve?" 
242. 
It would be absurd to invalidate special admissions programs out of a misguided 
concern for effects on minorities, who stand to gain most from such programs and 
who, as indicated by the amici in this case, are ardent exponents of the programs. 
The attitude of minority students about the supposed stigmatic effects of such 
programs is, perhaps, aptly summarized by a recent remark related to one of the 
authors of this brief: "Just let me have some of that establishment stigma." 
Brief for Petitioner at 48 n. 55, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 ( I  978) (No. 
76-8I I). 
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Michigan Law School,243 or the LSU Law Center, that I know. Justice 
Thomas 's loudest roar-"[T]he Law School has no compelling interest 
in either its existence or in its current educational and admissions 
policies"244-strikes me as shocking. All I will say is that the Governor 
of Michigan245 and the General Motors Corporation246 disagree. Finally, 
Justice Thomas 's question of stigma can be answered by a few 
minutes' contact and talk between persons of goodwill. Justice 
Clarence Thomas, of Pin Point, Georgia, as I have heard him roar in 
the RepoJts and laugh over supper with LSU law students, is a lion of 
weight to be reckoned with, to be sure, for a long, long time (born June 
23, 1948). 
D. Professor Lino Graglia & Co. 
Law professors, like the personalities of the Court, are a diverse 
crowd. Tulane Law Reviews invitation to Professor Lino Graglia, of 
the University of Texas School of Law, to join our table delights me. 
His deconstruction of Grutter, I am sure, will clash with mine. He is a 
lion scholar, whose roar I enjoy. I admire his tenacity. Like Justice 
Scalia, Professor Graglia is blessed with the fire of Sicilian blood. As 
243. In the words of Evan Caminker, who succeeded Jeffrey Lehman a s  Dean of the 
University of Michigan Law School in August 2003, shortly after Grutter v. Bollinger was 
announced: 
I believe, with all due respect, that such a challenge to our identity and aspirations 
is misguided. It is laudable for the State to choose to build a superb educational 
institution serving both the State's citizenry and the country as a whole. And the 
Law School clearly repays the State's confidence. 
We attract the best and brightest and offer them an unsurpassed legal 
education. Our students serve our State and Nation exceedingly well even during 
their schooling by, for example, ably representing real clients in our first-rank 
clinical programs. Our graduates become leaders in courtrooms, boardrooms, 
judicial chambers, and governmental cabinets both within the State and all across 
the land. The suggestion that only private schools may maintain standards of 
excellence high enough to put graduates in leadership roles serving vital interests 
around the country and world-while we public institutions should clip our 
wings-is ill-considered. 
Evan Caminker, Dean s Message, LAW QUAD. Norns, Summer 2003, at 2. 
244. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
245. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Jermifer M. Granholm at 2-3, Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306 �20�3) (No. 02-241) ("[T]his case is unquestionably of interest to the people of 
the State of M1ch1gan and warrants participation by Michigan's Governor as amicus curiae."). 
246. See Brief of Amicus Curiae General Motors Corp. at 261 ,  Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 l!.S. 306 .(2003) (No. 02-241) ("General Motors strongly believes that the future of Amencan businesses depends upon the availability of a diverse group of well-trained 
graduates."). 
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for Professor Graglia 's convictions, he may be right. In my assessment 
of the other fellow's views, I always try to keep in mind Justice 
Holmes's advice to Justice Sutherland, when the latter turned 70 years 
old: "When I reached your age, Sonny, I finally realized that I am not 
God." 
Earlier on the road from Brown to Grutter, I asked for Professor 
Graglia's advice. This was in his office at the University of Texas Law 
School. I was fighting to save two small, rural elementary schools out 
in the country in Rapides Parish, Louisiana--<me white, one black­
from a federal desegregation decree that killed both schools in the 
pursuit of a logical extreme. In my judgment, the decree crossed 
Holmes 's line of demarcation limiting all rights. There was no 
accommodation. There was no judicial balance. Professor Graglia 
sympathized with me. Here was another disaster by decree for his 
book,241 but he was not optimistic. We parted company. I made my 
way to the John Minor Wisdom United States Courthouse on Camp 
Street. After two hearings and twenty-four months in the Fifth Circuit, 
I got four out of six judicial votes but lost the case.248 So it goes. We 
did better in United States v. Lowsiana,249 where we managed by a vote 
of 3-0 in the Fifth Circuit to fend off Justice Categorical's summary 
judgment dismantling Southern University Law Center. This gave me 
comfort. Three of Judge John Minor Wisdom's successors on the Fifth 
Circuit tempered the lower court (Chief Judge Charles Schwartz's) 
logical extreme with Holmes's neighborhood of competing interests. 
Professor Graglia is a strident opponent of Bakke's balance. 
250 
"With the other justices splitting four to four on the applicability of 
Title VI to whites, Justice Powell wrote the deciding opinion, choosing, 
247. LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON 
RACE ANDTHE ScHOOLS (1976). 
248. Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd. [Forest Hill f/j, 702 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1 983) 
[hereinafter Forest Hill llj; Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 646 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1981) 
[hereinafter Forest J/JJl lj. 
249. 9 F.3d 1 1 59, 1 1 7 1  (5th Cir. 1993). The district court had dismantled the four state 
higher education governance boards and Southern University Law Center, all of which we 
stoutly opposed in the Fifth Circuit. Held: Remedial order VACATED; summary judgment 
on liability REVERSED; REMANDED. Thereafter, this twenty-year-old litigation was 
sweetly settled and Southern University Law Center continues its vital work today. 
250. And his opposition goes back years. See Lino A. Graglia, Racially 
Discriminatory Admission to Public Institutions of Higher Education, 9 Sw. U. L. REV. 583 
(1977) [hereinafter Graglia, Racially Discriminatory Admission]; Graglia, supra note 237; 
Lino A. Graglia, The "Affmnative Action" Fraud, 54 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 31 
(l 998); Lino A. Graglia, Do Racial Preferences Cause Rather Than Remedy the Black 
Academic-Performance Gap?, 80 Tux. L. REV. 933 (2002). 
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typically for him, to have it both ways,"1" says our Texas friend. 
"Powell, always seeking a middle way, held that discrimination against 
whites was every bit as unconstitutional as discrimination against 
blacks, except that just a little of it would be okay."252 Of Justice 
Powell's "diversity" rationale, Professor Graglia says, "surely no one 
except him would have imagined that racial 'diversity' is a 'compelling 
interest' in higher education."253 I do not think it will trouble Professor 
Graglia that "the congenitally ambivalent Justice O'Connor,"254 as 
Graglia describes her, far from imagining diversity as a compelling 
interest, holds exactly that in Grutter v. Bollinger. Professor Graglia 
will still roar. 
Why is that? Because, along with others, Professor Graglia 
sincerely believes "(t]he principle that no person should be 
disadvantaged by government because of race-a corollary of the 
basic democratic ideal of individual human worth, dignity, and 
responsibility . . .  is perhaps as valuable and as close to an absolute as 
any principle we have," and "to qualify the principle is effectively to 
destroy it."255 The late Professor Alexander Bickel of the Yale Law 
School is o f  the same mind: "For at least a generation the lesson of the 
great decisions of this [Supreme] Court and the lesson of 
contemporary history have been the same: discrimination on the basis 
of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong and 
destructive of democratic society."256 
I am reminded of Professor Bickel's criticism in his book The 
Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics of 
Justice Hugo Black's reading of the Fourteenth Amendment.257 Of 
Justice Black's dissent in Adamson v. Califomia,258 Bickel says: 
"Within two years, Professor Charles Fairman had conclusively 
disproved Justice Black's contention; at least, such is the weight of 
opinion among disinterested observers."259 To this, Hugo Black writes 
in the margin of his personal copy of Bickel's book: "That is his view 
25 1 .  Graglia, supra note 237, at 1 2 1 1 .  
252. Id at l 22 1 -2 2 .  
2 5 3 .  Id a t  1 223.  
254. Id 
255. Graglia, Racially Discnininatory Admission, supra note 250, at 5 83-84, 596. 
256. Id at 585 (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae Anti-Defamation League of B'nai 
B'rith at 16, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416  U.S. 3 1 2  ( 1974)). 
257. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT TilE BAR OF POLITICS ( 1962). 
258. 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947), overmled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 ( 1 964). 
259. BICKEL, supra note 257, at 102 (footnote omitted). 
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and the 'weight of opinion' is his own view."260 Later in the book when 
Bickel attacks Justice Black's view of the First Amendment as resting 
"on a historical hypothesis suspected of being (or known to be) 
erroneous,"261 Justice Black writes, ''An imputation, one of many, that 
my expression of views about the First Amendment are intellectually 
dishonest."262 
Now, for reasons I have voiced, I do not subscribe to Professor 
Graglia and Co.'s "series of absolutes." I am quoting another of Justice 
Black's marginal annotations to Professor Bickel 's book-"His series 
of absolutes."263 I do not agree, respectfully, with Professor Graglia 
when he says "the Bakke decision was not an instance of judicial good 
faith."264 Nor to my eye is there anything ambivalent about Justice 
O'Connor's opinions in Gratz and Gruffer. There is only balance, the 
middle way, the way of Justice Powell. 
VI. SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
A. Eiwin N Gn'swold 
Twenty-five years ago, Harvard Law School's Dean, Erwin N. 
Griswold, offered "Some Observations on the DeFunis Case."265 Later 
in life, Dean Griswold followed my struggle to save Southern 
University Law Center with great interest. He offered encouraging 
words to me in the moments of self-doubt and distrust that come to us 
all. He helped me grow as a teacher and as a scholar. His note of 
approval when I took Bruce Fein to task for putting Justice Scalia on a 
pedestal in his article A Court of Mediocrity,266 means much to me. 
Erwin N. Griswold got us on the road to Gruffer in the first place. As 
Dean of Harvard Law School, he implemented a policy of inclusion 
260. This annotation appears in Justice Black's penciled handwriting on the left-hand 
margin of page I 02 of Justice Black's personal copy of Bickel 's book, housed when I studied 
it during my year as a Judicial Fellow at the Court ( 1 975-76) in the Hugo Black Reading 
Room of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
261 .  BICKEL, supra note 257, at 1 10 .  
262. This time Justice Black's response to Bickel is spread over the bottom margin, in 
bold handwriting, of page 1 1 0 of Justice Black's copy of Bickel 's book. 
263. This penciled retort is in Justice Black's copy of Bickel's book, on the right-hand 
margin of page 1 03.  
264. Graglia, supra note 237, at 1 224. 
265. Erwin N. Griswold, Some Observations on the DeFunis Case, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 
5 1 2 ( 1 975). 
266. Fein, supra note 225, at 75. 
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that brought modest numbers of racial and ethic minorities, as well a� 
women, to the Harvard Law School.267 
Let me pay my respects, and my debt, to Dean Griswold b) 
invoking his wisdom of twenty-five years ago in concluding my owr 
Tulane table talk on Gmtzand Grutter. 
To paraphrase only slightly Dean Griswold's syllogism in his 
observations on the DeFunis case: 
Major premise. The Constitution is color-blind. It forbids 
discrimination on grounds of race or color. 
Minor Premise. [Grutter] was denied admission because [she] is 
white. 
Conclusion. The exclusion of [ Grutter] violated the Constitution. 268 
Of this syllogism, the syllogism of the Absolutist School, Dean 
Griswold says, 
But that is delusively simple. It ignores history. More specifically, it 
overstates the major premise; and it understates the minor premise. It 
ignores history because it disregards prior discrimination and allows no 
room for affirmative action. It makes it impossible to take steps to 
correct or alleviate the consequences of past discrimination, not only to 
individual members of minority groups, but also to society as a whole. 
It overstates the major premise because the Constitution is not wholly 
color-blind. . . . What the Constitution forbids is invidious 
discrimination, and there are many refinements and nuances in 
determining that question. 269 
DeFunis was not denied admission because "he was white, 
simpliciter," says Dean Griswold. 210 "The problem was much more 
complicated than that."211 The Law School denied DeFunis admission 
because, taking into account a considerable complex of factors, 
including the fact that he was not a member of a minority group, a 
judgment was made that the overall structure of the first year class at 
the University of Washington law school would better apportion the 
opportunities of legal education and reflect the needs of the community 
if another were selected rather than he.212 
267. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 1 1 9, at 5 .  
268. Griswold, sup.ra note 265, at 5 1 8. 
269. Id at 5 1 9. 
270. Id 
271 .  Id 
272. Id 
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Of course, the rationale of Gmtz and Grutter diverges from Dean 
Griswold's .  Bakke's balance intervenes. But in his next paragraph of 
twenty-five years ago, a paragraph of process and method, Dean 
Griswold voices the same chord of balance that is Justice Powell's way: 
There are many delicacies in this judgment. And there are surely 
limits within which it can be made. . . . It is o f  course appropriate to 
emphasize the delicacy of such judgments, and the existence of the 
limits. But this should not lead to the bald adoption of the syllogistic 
approach which simply ignores the difficulties, the nuances and the real 
bl . thi 273 pro ems m s area. 
Justice O'Connor's opimon for the Court in Gruffer 
acknowledges that in our society "race unfortunately still matters."214 
Justice Ginsburg, like Brandeis before her, documents the fact. Of this 
real problem, in their dissents, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas say 
nothing at all. They blow only one horn of a constitutional dilemma, 
as Paul Freund was fond of saying. "Blowing one horn of a dilemma 
may produce the purest of tones, but the poorest of constitutional 
melodies."215 "It is another heresy which prefers the part to the whole 
and attempts to deal with the complexity of life by a single supreme 
simplicity."216 A "single supreme simplicity" is exactly what Justice 
O'Connor is wary of And Justice Powell before her. And Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter in his day. 
B The UJ1ce of Justke Powell 
I believe Erwin N. Griswold would be pleased with the Court's 
judgment in Gratz and Grutter. I know he admired Justice Powell. 
Dean Griswold once told me that he regarded his behind-the-scenes 
role in the nomination of Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to the Supreme Court as 
his greatest public service.277 Perhaps in Gratz and in Grutter, Dean 
273. Id 
274. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335 (2003). 
275. Freund, supra note 56, at 23. 
276. Philip Toynbee, Two Kinds of Extremism, OBSERVER, Feb. 8, 1959, at 20, quoted 
mPAULA. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 1 58 (1968). 
277. 
Two of President Nixon's choices were rejected by the Senate. Dean Griswold, 
who was then Solicitor General, called Attorney General Mitchell and 
recommended Lewis Powell. "He doesn't want it," Mitchell replied. . . . "How do 





Griswold pushed ahead: "You will never know unless the President calls Lewis 
Powell personally and offers him the nomination." That is exactly what happened. 
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Griswold would hear the same echo of Justice Powell's voice that l 
hear. 
The day he died, early Tuesday morning, August 25, 1 998, l 
talked to my seminar students about Justice Powell. I played a tape 
recording of his swearing-in, a treasured piece of sound unearthed 
years earlier on a seminar field trip to the Supreme Court and to the 
National Archives.278 Justice Powell botched his oath of office. ''And 
that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perf orm"-this was 
Chief Justice Burger's cue-but somehow Lewis F. Powell, Jr., left 
hand raised, right hand on the Bible, recited only: "And that I will 
faithfully . . . discharge and perform." He plum forgot "impartially." 
Chief Justice Burger let it pass. The day he died, Lewis Powell's soft 
Southern voice was heard at LSU Law Center. 
Justice Powell, I tell my students, was a paragon of impartiality 
and judicial balance, as I understand the Court's personalities and its 
process. I recall sending him a letter about his mediating opinion in 
Bakke. In Justice Powell's soft voice of judicial balance, I sensed the 
Richmond, Virginia, echo of Chief Justice Marshall. This is high 
praise, but Justice Powell deserved it. Ever modest, he wrote back 
doubting the comparison and saying his place in judicial history "will 
be only a footnote." 
After talking it over with [Mrs. Powell (Josephine) and] his family, Lewis F. Powell, 
Jr., ofVirginia accepted the nomination [and the Senate confirmed]. 
"I regard that as my finest public service," Dean Griswold said of his 
behind-the-scenes role. 
Baier, supra note I ,  at 4 1 1 .  
278. In the seminar, my students reach the peak of their legal education in the third 
year when otherwise they are quite asleep mentally from the rote of Mr. Langdell 's case 
method. They serve as mock Justices of the United States Supreme Court and hear a case 
currently pending and argued by two other members of the seminar, who use the actual briefs 
submitted by the lawyers in the case, most recently Lawrence v. Texas (5-4 for Lawrence in 
the seminar; 5-4 for Lawrence in the Supreme Court). For details of the seminar, see O.W 
Wollensak, Hugo LafiJyette Black and John Marshall Harlan: Two Faces of Constitutional 
Law-Wit(1 Som� Notes on the Teaching ofThayer's Subject, 9 S.U. L. REv. I ,  22-23 ( 1 982). 
For other mnovat1ons m what the author has dubbed a "pedagogy of persons" in our law 
schools, see Paul R. Baier, Mat Is the Use of a Law Book Without Pictures or 
Conversations?, 34 J. LEGAL Eouc. 619, 637 (1984). 
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Justice Powell's voice is now the law of the land. My faith is that 
our Nation is better off twenty-five years after Bakke. As to twenty­
five years hence, to quote Justice Powell, "We shall see."279 
279. WILKINSON, supnrnote 89, at 1 1 8-19: 
[Justice Powell] taught, by example, a serenity in the face of ambiguity and 
uncertainty, something I found it difficult to achieve. "We shall see," he would 
sometimes say, when I rushed to ask if such and such would occur. His caution 
made him believe that careless and ebullient optimism could be a dangerous state. 
Five years later, Professor Wilkinson wound up his radiant reprise From Brown to 
Bakke: The Supreme Court and School Integration: 1954-1978, by quoting Professor 
Freund: "The very fact that [Bakke] is somewhat fuzzy . . .  leaves room for development, and 
on the whole that's a good thing." WILKINSON, supra note 1 5, at 306 (internal quotations 
omitted). Wilkinson adds: 
How much Bakke itself would influence the future remained to be seen. 
Contemporaries knew Brown to be a landmark case. "But none," noted Professor 
Kurland, "could really say in 1954 just how important it was to be." So it was in 
1978. Bakke, as Brown had been, was only a beginning. Where, one has to 
wonder, will it end? 
id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Philip Kurland, Questions Answered on Bakke Remain for the 
Future to Decide, ATLANTIC J., July 2, 1978). 
